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In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court announced 
for the first time that self-defense, not militia service, is the “core” of 
the right to keep and bear arms. However, the Court failed to articulate 
what that means for the right’s implementation. After Heller, most 
courts deciding Second Amendment questions have mentioned self-
defense only superficially or not at all. Some courts, however, have run 
to the opposite extreme, leaning heavily on the platitude that firearms 
have utility for lawful self-defense as a rationale for effectively 
immunizing them from regulation. This Article examines that 
inconsistency and considers whether self-defense law itself could 
provide stability and much-needed guidance for when, how, and which 
weapons receive constitutional protection. This exercise finds support 
in both Heller and historical precedent, and offers a helpful lens 
through which to consider the intersection of the Second Amendment 
and its stated self-defense purpose. At the same time, however, it 
exposes a tension within Heller, calling into question whether a 
Second Amendment grounded in self-defense gives more protection to 
handguns than to less lethal alternatives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An essential holding in District of Columbia v. Heller was that self-defense, 
not the protection of a “well regulated Militia,”1 is the “core” and “central 
component” of the right to keep and bear arms.2 The Supreme Court was 
emphatic about this point, referencing self-defense no fewer than eighty-three 
times.3 The Court went on to strike down two D.C. laws because they denied 
“law-abiding, responsible citizens” the right to keep handguns in the home and 
render them operable when needed for self-defense. Heller’s holding and 
reasoning led to concerns that the opinion expanded the right to keep and bear 
arms in a way that would cause weapons laws to fall like “dominoes.”4 This 
apprehension was driven in part by the fact that a need for self-defense can arise 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
2. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 630 (2008). For a discussion of how this 
reading overturned generations of federal court precedent grounding the Second Amendment in militia 
service, see Eric M. Ruben & Darrell A. H. Miller, Preface: The Second Generation of Second 
Amendment Law & Policy, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–3 (2017). The Supreme Court has not 
clarified whether interests other than self-defense have Second Amendment salience after Heller. See 
Joseph Blocher, Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 137 (2015) (“[T]he 
case for Second Amendment coverage of hunting and recreation is tenuous.”); Gregory P. Magarian, 
Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 
52 (2012) (“Heller emphatically rejects the position that the Second Amendment’s preamble limits the 
amendment to guaranteeing the people’s right, collectively, to constitute an armed state militia.”). As a 
practical matter, post-Heller case law has focused on the Second Amendment interest in self-defense, 
which is almost always the interest asserted by litigants. Consistent with that trend, I do not consider 
alternative bases for the Second Amendment right in this Article. 
3. See Heller, 554 U.S. 570. The Supreme Court matched Heller’s emphasis, again referencing 
“self-defense” eighty-three times, two years later in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
4. Id. at 679–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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virtually anywhere.5 Yet courts and commentators have failed to consider how 
self-defense itself is limited, let alone how those limitations might inform post-
Heller doctrine.6 Placing self-defense at the core of the Second Amendment did 
not thereby unfetter the right to keep and bear arms. Rather, Heller’s self-defense 
holding raised a new round of questions about the intersection of the Second 
Amendment and self-defense that the Court failed to answer.7 
As in other areas of constitutional law,8 developing Second Amendment 
doctrine that is consistent with the Amendment’s underlying purpose is crucial 
to scholarship and jurisprudence.9 A growing body of literature focuses on what 
post-Heller Second Amendment doctrine should look like,10 but scant attention 
has been paid to the role of self-defense in that doctrine.11 
5. Id.
6. A notable exception is Darrell A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 
80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (2017) [hereinafter Miller, Self-Defense] (suggesting that the state’s 
traditional role in regulating defensive force may have implications for the Second Amendment). 
7. As Justice Stephen Breyer stated in dissent, “self-defense . . . is the beginning, rather than 
the end, of any constitutional inquiry.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted). 
8. See, e.g., William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 253 (1966) (discussing Fourteenth Amendment doctrine and values); Martin H. Redish, The 
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1982) (discussing free speech doctrine and 
values of liberty and autonomy); Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access 
in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
1083, 1114–16 (1999) (arguing compelled speech interferes with First Amendment value in autonomy); 
Ann L. Schiavone, Unleashing the Fourteenth Amendment, 2016 WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 27 (2016) 
(considering doctrinal implications of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and equality). 
9. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) 
(describing how judicial doctrine implements constitutional meaning); Lawrence B. Solum, The 
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 100 (2010) (“In general, 
interpretation recognizes or discovers the linguistic meaning of an authoritative legal text.”); id. at 103 
(“Conceptually, construction gives legal effect to the semantic content of a legal text.”). 
10. Many of these efforts propose the migration of rules and standards from other areas of law. 
See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009) (discussing how Heller invoked First Amendment doctrine); Kenneth A. 
Klukowski, Making Second Amendment Law with First Amendment Rules: The Five-Tier Free Speech 
Framework and Public Forum Doctrine in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 93 NEB. L. REV. 429 
(2014) (proposing borrowing from First Amendment doctrine to implement the Second Amendment); 
David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 TENN. L. REV. 419 (2014) 
(same); Darrell A. H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us 
About the Second, 122 YALE L. J. 852 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Text, History, and Tradition] 
(proposing borrowing from Seventh Amendment doctrine to implement the Second Amendment); infra 
notes 86–90 and accompanying text (discussing how courts have borrowed from First Amendment 
doctrine in Second Amendment cases since Heller). 
11. Cf. Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, You Can Lead a Horse to Water: Heller and the Future 
of Second Amendment Scholarship, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2018) (identifying the role of self-defense 
in the Second Amendment’s implementation as a crucial open issue after Heller). One body of 
scholarship has discussed whether the Second Amendment constitutionalized some version of self-
defense. See infra note 38 (listing sources). These articles did not consider the inquiry made herein: how 
the law of self-defense informs the Second Amendment. In a recent book and an earlier article, Joseph 
Blocher and Darrell A. H. Miller contend that self-defense points to Second Amendment values. See 
JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, 
REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER (2018) [hereinafter BLOCHER & MILLER, THE POSITIVE 
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How does self-defense pertain to laws banning weapons on the basis of 
their lethality12 or restricting who can carry them on public streets?13 How is self-
defense relevant to the Second Amendment analysis of laws requiring handguns 
within a residence to be locked unless carried on the person?14 There are dozens 
of categories of weapons restrictions, and after Heller, all of them are exposed 
to constitutional challenge.15 Lower courts must resolve those challenges 
consistent with the Second Amendment’s self-defense core, but how to do so is 
undertheorized. 
The result has been divergent approaches among the lower courts, from 
ignoring self-defense altogether to insulating guns from regulation by relying on 
the truism that they can be used defensively.16 Both approaches run the risk of 
deviating from a truly self-defense-centered Amendment, and the latter approach 
could imperil much of our regulatory regime. 
This Article exposes the pervasive confusion about self-defense in Second 
Amendment case law. The Article presumes that the Court meant to invoke the 
traditional legal understanding of self-defense instead of the term’s colloquial, 
natural right, or other meaning. It then proposes a way that traditional legal 
understanding can play a more integral role in Second Amendment doctrine.17 In 
SECOND AMENDMENT]; Joseph Blocher & Darrell A. H. Miller, What is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, 
Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 347–54 
(2016) [hereinafter Blocher & Miller, What is Gun Control?]. To my knowledge, only one article 
contends that the law of self-defense can inform the boundaries of the post-Heller Second Amendment. 
See Miller, Self Defense, supra note 6 (tracing the history of common law self-defense from an excuse 
to a justification and discussing implications for the right to keep and bear arms). 
12. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 138 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[T]here is scant 
evidence in the record before us that the FSA-banned assault weapons and large capacity magazines are 
possessed, or even suitable, for self-protection.”). In keeping with common practice, I use the term 
“assault weapon,” although I recognize the term’s imprecision. 
13. Some courts have characterized the Second Amendment as protecting a right to “armed self-
defense,” which is “as important outside the home as inside.” Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 
650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012). Others have taken a 
less expansive view of the Second Amendment’s coverage outside the home. See, e.g., United States v. 
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“There may or may not be 
a Second Amendment right in some places beyond the home, but we have no idea what those places are, 
what the criteria for selecting them should be, what sliding scales of scrutiny might apply to them, or 
any one of a number of other questions.”); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177–78 (Md. 2011) (“If 
the Supreme Court . . . meant [for the Second Amendment right] to extend beyond home possession, it 
will need to say so more plainly.”); Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound 
Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009) [hereinafter Miller, Guns as Smut] (proposing a 
home-bound Second Amendment). 
14. See, e.g., Jackson v. City. & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding 
requirement that handguns in the home be either locked or kept on the person). 
15. See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms after Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, app. B (2018) (identifying sixty different 
types of weapons regulations that have been subject to Second Amendment challenges). 
16. See infra Part I.B. 
17. In this Article, I join those trying to make post-Heller doctrine more intelligible. I thus do 
not set out to corroborate or dispute whether, as a matter of first principle, the Supreme Court was correct 
to place self-defense, as opposed to the preservation of a well-regulated militia, at the core of the Second 
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particular, the Article suggests that the limitations of lawful self-defense can 
inform Second Amendment doctrine by lending principled requirements and 
procedures for the right to keep and bear arms. 
The law of self-defense limits defensive force in various ways. This Article 
focuses on three limitations in particular: the two key self-defense requirements 
of necessity and proportionality,18 and the fact that the right to self-defense is 
primarily implemented as a defense to criminal charges. As this Article shows, 
the Supreme Court in Heller left open the possibility that similar requirements 
and procedures could delineate when the Second Amendment protects the right 
to carry a loaded firearm for use in self-defense.19 In addition to being consistent 
with Heller, drawing on self-defense law in this way accords with a line of public 
carry restrictions and judicial precedent from the 1800s.20 Importing self-
defense-derived requirements and procedures into Second Amendment doctrine 
could help courts fill gaps while staying true to Heller and historical case law. 
The fit of this doctrinal approach, however, is closer for some Second 
Amendment contexts than others. The Second Amendment logically protects 
conduct that must take place far in advance of a confrontation, like acquiring a 
Second Amendment arm and training to use it. The Article grapples with whether 
necessity and proportionality, the linchpins of self-defense law, can be adapted 
for such circumstances.21 In the absence of a relatively proximate self-defense 
situation, it is difficult to determine with precision what arms are necessary or 
proportionate for self-defense. However, this does not mean that self-defense law 
has no role to play in such circumstances, such as offering normative 
commitments that should be reflected—and certainly not undermined—in 
Second Amendment doctrine. 
Amendment right. By juxtaposing Heller and our legal tradition of self-defense, however, I expose a 
tension within Heller and a novel critique of the opinion: the majority’s ruling is arguably inconsistent 
with self-defense’s orientation away from lethal violence. See infra notes 26–27, 286–298, and 
accompanying text. 
18. My analysis includes discussion of two proxies for necessity: imminence and the traditional 
duty to retreat before using lethal defensive force. See infra notes 157–179 and accompanying text. This 
in no way means that other limitations on lawful defensive force are not relevant, such as the requirement 
of a “reasonable belief” about the need for defensive force. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW 212–13, 225–29 (2018) (summarizing this requirement and contemporary debates 
about its implementation); infra notes 139, 294 (noting other potentially relevant aspects of self-defense 
law). 
19. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576, 635 (2008). 
20. See infra notes 220–225 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth-century legislation 
and related case law). 
21. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1818 (2007) (contending that self-defense requirements 
can be adapted for circumstances with less urgency and more anticipation than typical self-defense). 
Volokh notes that rationales for imminence, like avoiding erroneous claims of necessity and therefore 
avoiding unnecessary deaths, are weaker in some contexts. He suggests that in the medical self-defense 
context, the focus should be on a “present medical threat (your kidneys are actually failing) and the lack 
of a satisfactory permitted therapy.” Id. at 1824. 
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Of course, scholars have debated the commitments underlying the right of 
self-defense.22 While this Article does not purport to identify all such 
commitments, it raises one that is evident from the time of the Second 
Amendment’s enactment but is missing from its post-Heller implementation: the 
preservation of life.23 
The law of self-defense functions to shepherd conflicts away from lethal 
violence, and thus away from handgun violence, absent rare circumstances.24 
And yet Heller assumes that the possession of one lethal weapon, the handgun, 
receives maximal protection without regard to its lethality.25 That disconnect—
between the orientation of self-defense law and Heller’s assumption about 
handguns—suggests a novel critique of the opinion. In particular, Heller may be 
doctrinally inconsistent by placing lawful self-defense at the core of the right, 
but neglecting the nonlethal orientation baked into that core.26 Indeed, this 
Article considers whether Heller’s exaltation of handguns not only exists in 
tension with that orientation, but actively undermines it.27 
This Article is but an initial exploration of the intersection of the Second 
Amendment and the law of self-defense.28 My goal is neither to exhaust the 
possibilities regarding this intersection nor to resolve all of the open questions 
raised by Heller’s self-defense holding. My analysis suggests that no uniform 
rule or standard can accommodate the different ways the Second Amendment 
and lawful self-defense intersect. Hopefully, given the stakes for both individual 
self-defense and the government’s ability to regulate the tools of violence, other 
analyses will follow. 
22. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 223–25 (2018) (discussing different theories); 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1978) (same). 
Fletcher observed that the law governing defensive force is a “composite” and “hybrid” model that 
reflects “deeper ideological clashes.” Id. at 874. In this Article, I use the word “commitment,” but do 
not purport to distinguish that term from values, principles, orientation, or other words used to describe 
the normative basis for our legal tradition of self-defense. Cf. Blocher & Miller, What is Gun Control?, 
supra note 11, at 348 (stating that it is “of no real significance” whether the Second Amendment’s 
purposes are called “approaches, theories, values, or principles”). 
23. See Paul H. Robinson, A Right to Bear Firearms But Not to Use Them? Defensive Force
Rules and the Increasing Effectiveness of Non-Lethal Weapons, 89 B.U. L. REV. 251, 252–53, 256 
(2009). 
24.  Id.
25. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008); infra notes 52–57, and 
accompanying text. 
26. Thus, this Article supplements the critique that Heller applies originalism in inconsistent 
ways. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); infra note 291 (listing other sources). 
27. See infra 286–298, and accompanying text. 
28. This Article thus joins a growing body of scholarship addressing how post-Heller Second 
Amendment rights intersect with other areas of law. See, e.g., Blocher & Miller, What is Gun Control?, 
supra note 11 (tort); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Preemption and Commandeering Without Congress, 70 
STAN. L. REV. 2029 (2018) (federalism); Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens and the Nature of Judicial 
Review, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 97 (2016) (tort); Magarian, supra note 2 (First Amendment); 
Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 104 IOWA L. REV. 223 (2018) (First Amendment). 
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Part I of this Article identifies and analyzes how Heller obfuscated the 
import of placing self-defense at the core of the right to keep and bear arms, 
giving way to conflicting lower court analyses and outcomes. Part II proposes a 
way to clarify the role of self-defense in Second Amendment law: applying self-
defense-derived rules and requirements to Second Amendment cases. This 
framework helps to resolve various live disputes and shows that placing self-
defense at the Second Amendment’s core need not lead to an unfettered right to 
arms. The Article concludes with high-level observations about how the law of 
self-defense suggests that the Second Amendment may be narrower than many 
courts and scholars assume. 
I. 
SELF-DEFENSE IN CURRENT SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
Self-defense pervaded Heller’s declaration of an individual right to keep 
and bear arms, but the opinion failed to translate that emphasis to any doctrinal 
rules, tests, or standards that could guide decisions about when weapons 
regulations violate the Second Amendment.29 This Part analyzes the imprecise 
ways the majority relied on self-defense in Heller. It then identifies two 
contradictory usages of self-defense in subsequent Second Amendment case law. 
A. Self-Defense as the ‘Core’ of the Right
Dick Heller initiated his lawsuit because he wanted to own a handgun and 
render it operable for “lawful self-defense in the home.”30 Two D.C. laws 
prevented him from doing so: one requiring firearms to be locked or inoperable 
at all times, and the other entirely banning possession of his desired weapon, a 
handgun. Heller challenged both laws on the grounds that they violated his 
Second Amendment rights. For the better part of a century, the judicial consensus 
was that the militia clause limited the Second Amendment,31 meaning that Heller 
was seeking a jurisprudential sea change. He asserted no interest in militia 
service, but rather an interest rooted in private self-defense. When the case 
reached the Supreme Court, a bare majority of the Justices outright rejected that 
self-defense was “merely a ‘subsidiary interest’ of the right to keep and bear 
arms.”32 Quite the contrary, after analyzing how the Second Amendment would 
be understood by “ordinary citizens in the founding generation,”33 the majority 
29. See FALLON, supra note 9, at 5 (observing how judicial “design of implementing strategies” 
follows “the identification of constitutional meaning”). 
30. Complaint at 4, Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 03-
cv-213), ECF No. 1; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 & n.2 (construing Heller’s complaint “as seeking 
the right to render a firearm operable and carry it about his home in that condition only when necessary 
for self-defense”). 
31. See Ruben & Miller, supra note 2, at 1–3 (describing this consensus). 
32. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (quoting id. at 714 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
33. Id. at 577. 
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deemed individual self-defense the “core” and “central component” of the 
right.34 
After placing self-defense at the core of the Second Amendment, the logical 
next step was to articulate what “self-defense” meant in the context of the Second 
Amendment and, relatedly, how it informed constitutional doctrine.35 The Court 
qualified “self-defense” with the adjective “lawful,”36 and it characterized the 
core Second Amendment interest as “being armed and ready for offensive or 
defensive action in a case of conflict with another person,”37 a situation governed 
by the law of self-defense.38 The most natural reading of the Second 
Amendment’s “core lawful purpose”39 is thus self-defense as understood by 
Anglo-American law.40 That is the way the dissenting Justices in Heller 
interpreted the majority opinion without any objection.41 This Article presumes 
that understanding, though scholars have suggested other possibilities, ranging 
from a natural right conceptualization of self-defense to “self-defense” as a proxy 
for unarticulated values.42 
34. Id. at 599, 630. 
35. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[S]elf-defense . . . is the beginning, rather than the end, 
of any constitutional inquiry.”) (emphasis in original). 
36. Id. at 630 (majority opinion) (noting “core lawful purpose of self-defense”) (emphasis 
added). 
37. Id. at 584 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting)). 
38. Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court incorporated the Second Amendment to apply 
against state and local governments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). In its opinion, 
the Court emphasized that the Second Amendment’s core purpose of self-defense has been “recognized 
by many legal systems,” thus nodding to the rules and requirements “legal systems” deploy to determine 
when defensive force is lawful. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767. This reading is also implicit in a body of 
scholarship focused on whether the Second Amendment constitutionalizes the law of self-defense. See 
Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal Law, Grammatically-
Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment Musings, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1205 (2008); Nicholas 
J. Johnson, Self-Defense?, 2 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 187 (2006); David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of
Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 248 (2008); Nelson Lund, A 
Constitutional Right to Self Defense?, 2 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 213 (2006); Nelson Lund, The Second
Amendment and the Inalienable Right to Self-Defense, 16 HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 17, 2014).
39. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
40. See Miller, Self Defense, supra note 6, at 86 (presuming this understanding). 
41. Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority’s apparent 
enshrinement of “the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution”); see also McDonald, 561 
U.S. at 893 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (similar). 
42. See, e.g., BLOCHER & MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 11 (proxy 
for unidentified values like autonomy, democracy, or personal safety); Blocher & Miller, What is Gun 
Control?, supra note 11, at 347–54 (same); Kopel, supra note 38 (natural right). If Heller invoked a 
natural right understanding of self-defense, the common law remains relevant to the extent it 
“determin[es] or ‘posit[s]’” the boundaries of natural rights. Randy Barnett, The Intersection of Natural 
Rights and Positive Constitutional Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 853, 863 (1993); see also Randy Barnett, 
Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 
93, 117–18 (1995) (“Traditionally, this distinction between rightful and wrongful conduct was provided 
by the common law which determined a person’s legal rights.”). The converse, too, has been suggested: 
that the common law’s principles are founded, at least in part, on natural rights. See Commonwealth v. 
Selfridge (The Trial of Thomas O. Selfridge for the Killing of Charles Austin, Boston, 1806), 2 Am. 
St. 
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To complicate matters further, the Court in Heller invoked self-defense in 
different ways. As the Court framed it, Heller claimed that one of the laws at 
issue, a firearm storage requirement, violated his “right to render a firearm 
operable and carry it about his home in that condition only when necessary for 
self-defense.”43 “The only dispute” regarding the storage law, as Justice Breyer 
put it, was “whether the Constitution requires an exception that would allow 
someone to render a firearm operational when necessary for self-defense (i.e., 
that the firearm may be operated under circumstances where the common law 
would normally permit a self-defense justification in defense against a criminal 
charge).”44 The District of Columbia urged the Court to read that exception into 
the law and Heller agreed that doing so would grant him the relief he sought.45 
The Court seemed to acknowledge that such a self-defense exception would 
be salient by going out of its way to find it “precluded by the unequivocal text” 
of the statute.46 The majority opinion emphasized the absence of a self-defense 
exception repeatedly when distinguishing historical firearm storage laws. None 
of the historical laws would be applied to retrieving and loading a firearm when 
needed for lawful self-defense.47 In this view, the law’s constitutional infirmity 
was that it precluded access to firearms at the time their possession was 
“necessary” for “immediate self-defense,”48 signaling that necessity and one of 
its proxies, imminence—both longstanding limitations on lawful defensive 
force49—were relevant to the Second Amendment analysis. Moreover, an 
Trials 544, 700 (Ma. 1806) (“The principles [of self-defense] which I have thus stated are recognized by 
all the books which have been read, and are founded in the natural and civil rights, and in the social 
duties of man.”). William Blackstone’s treatise on English common law, which Heller characterizes as 
“the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 593–94 
(majority opinion) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)), refers to self-defense as a natural 
right but also sets out how the common law defines that right in practice. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARY ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *140 (1765); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARY 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, *184–85 (1769). As one opinion puts it, the right to self-defense “is 
founded on the . . . law of nature,” but it is the common law requirement of “necessity of the case, and 
that only which justifies a killing—on that necessity the right to kill rests.” Isaacs v. State, 25 Tex. 174, 
177 (Tex. 1860); see also Kopel, supra note 38 (observing connections between the natural right of self-
defense and common law). 
43. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 & n.2. 
44. Id. at 692 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
45. Id. at 630 (majority opinion). 
46. Id. (relying also on “the presence of certain other enumerated exceptions” and D.C. Court 
of Appeals precedent) (citing McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 755–56 (D.C. 1978)). 
47. See id. at 632–33 (finding it “inconceivable that [a New York law] would have been 
enforced against a person exercising his right to self-defense,” “unlikely that [a Pennsylvania law] would 
have been enforced against a person who used firearms for self-defense” “implausible that [a Boston 
law] would have been enforced against a citizen acting in self-defense”). 
48. Id. at 576, 635. 
49. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
(“[T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force 
is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such 
other person on the present occasion.”); infra Part II.A.1 (discussing these requirements). 
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“exception” to the firearm storage requirement50 would most naturally operate 
as a defense to a charge of violating that requirement, akin to how self-defense 
operates as a defense to otherwise criminal violence. 
The Heller majority, however, failed to spell out precisely how those 
standards would work in the Second Amendment context and ignored them 
completely when striking down the other law at issue, a handgun ban.51 
Necessity played no apparent role in deciding whether and how the Second 
Amendment protects the mere possession of a handgun. Instead, the Court relied 
heavily on the handgun’s appeal. The law prohibited “the most popular weapon 
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home,”52 a weapon 
“overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [lawful self-defense],”53 and 
“the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s 
home and family.”54 The handgun, according to “the American people,” is the 
“quintessential self-defense weapon.”55 That supposed popularity,56 according to 
the majority, insulated handguns from prohibition, no matter the strength of the 
government’s regulatory rationale or even whether the law allowed the 
possession of alternative firearms.57 In another part of the opinion, the majority 
endorsed the historical view that it is permissible to ban “dangerous and unusual” 
weapons, but failed to define that category beyond suggesting it included “M-16 
rifles and the like” but not handguns.58 
50. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
51. Id. at 629. 
52. Id.
53. Id. at 628. 
54. Id. at 628–29. 
55. Id. at 629. 
56. The empirical case for the Supreme Court’s assumption that handguns are the most popular 
weapons for self-defense in the home is far from clear. Nowhere did the Court cite statistics about 
handgun ownership. Instead, the Supreme Court cited the lower court opinion, Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–
29, which in turn cited a 1995 empirical study by criminologists Gary Kleck and Marc Gertz about the 
prevalence of defensive gun uses. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
The Kleck/Gertz study did not purport to estimate the prevalence of handgun ownership for self-defense. 
Rather, Kleck and Gertz attempted to estimate the number of annual defensive gun uses. See Gary Kleck 
& Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 160 (1995). Most eligible Americans do not possess firearms for self-
defense (or any other purpose), and the percentage of households that do is dropping, according to one 
commonly used survey, from 47 percent in 1980 to 31 percent in 2014. See Philip J. Cook and Harold
A. Pollack, Reducing Access to Guns by Violent Offenders, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 2, 5 
(2017) (citing data from the General Social Survey). On an individual level, only 22 percent of American 
adults own a firearm; 78 percent do not. Id. Among the minority of Americans who choose to possess a 
firearm, handguns have become more popular, now comprising 60 percent of new purchases. Deborah 
Azrael, et al., The Stock and Flow of U.S. Firearms: Results from the 2015 National Firearms Survey, 
3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 38, 48 (2017). But that rise in popularity among gun owners is a 
far cry from declaring handguns “the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the 
home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
57. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35 (refusing to consider any public interests favoring 
regulation); id. at 629 (refusing to consider alternative firearms). 
58. Id. at 627. 
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Heller did not expound the consequences of placing self-defense at the core 
of the right to keep and bear arms. The Court suggested that self-defense 
requirements like necessity and imminence may have purchase for the 
constitutionality of the firearm storage law but did not explain how.59 But self-
defense requirements had no obvious role when it came to the constitutionality 
of the handgun ban.60 Despite dozens of opportunities to clarify the relationship 
between self-defense and the Second Amendment, the Court has so far refused 
to do so.61 
B. The Lower Courts and Self-Defense
In the absence of additional Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have 
developed Second Amendment doctrine in the course of deciding over one 
thousand post-Heller constitutional challenges to weapons policies.62 Far from 
clarifying the role of self-defense, the resulting opinions have run to opposite 
extremes. Most fail to mention self-defense at all or do so only superficially. 
Others lean heavily on the platitude that firearms have utility for lawful self-
defense in order to immunize them from regulation. 
59. See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text. 
61. The Supreme Court issued rulings in two post-Heller Second Amendment cases, but neither 
greatly adds to an understanding of the doctrinal role for self-defense. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
which incorporated the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court emphasized 
that the right to self-defense is “basic,” having been “recognized by many legal systems from ancient 
times to the present day.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767, 791 (2010). By alluding to 
“legal systems,” the Court again seemed to make a reference to the law of self-defense. But the Court 
had no reason to consider how self-defense law informs Second Amendment doctrine. The Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to address that question in Caetano v. Massachusetts, but failed to add any 
clarity. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016). Caetano involved a ban on stun guns that 
was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on the grounds that stun guns were not “arms” 
as contemplated by the Second Amendment. Commonwealth v. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d 688, 691 (Mass. 
2015). The law of self-defense has a lot to say about lethal versus non-lethal defensive force, which 
could have been relevant to deciding the case. See infra Part II. But in a two-page per curiam opinion, 
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded without even mentioning “self-defense.” Caetano, 136 S. Ct. 
1027. The opinion no doubt reflects the staying power of Heller—the justices unanimously agreed that 
Heller required vacatur—but says little more about Second Amendment doctrine. Apart from McDonald 
and Caetano, the Supreme Court has refused to intervene in dozens of post-Heller Second Amendment 
cases. See LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION SUMMARY 3 (2017). 
Justice Thomas has filed dissents from denial of certiorari in four of those cases. See Silvester v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 945 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (mem.); Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (mem.); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (mem.); Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (mem.). However, the Court’s apparent reticence may be at an end after the grant of certiorari 
in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 
S. Ct. 939 (Jan. 22, 2019).
62. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 15 (analyzing 1,153 Second Amendment challenges 
between Heller and February 1, 2016); see also Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: 
Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457 (2012) (discussing the 
important role of lower federal courts in the development of constitutional law). 
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1. Self-Defense as a Nonfactor in Second Amendment Cases 
In light of the unclear role of self-defense in Heller, it is unsurprising that 
one approach in the lower courts has been to ignore it altogether. My recent 
empirical study of Second Amendment case law identified 1,153 legal challenges 
after Heller; for 761 of them, the court’s opinion did not refer to the challenger’s 
interest in self-defense at all.63 Of those that did, many simply cite Heller 
regarding the Second Amendment’s self-defense core before relying on other 
tools to resolve cases.64 
Courts considering Second Amendment questions after Heller have 
coalesced around a two-part methodology65 employed in other areas of 
constitutional jurisprudence, including free speech cases.66 At step one, they 
inquire whether regulated conduct, people, or weapons fall within the scope of 
the Second Amendment.67 If not, then no constitutional problem exists. If so, 
however, the court proceeds to the second step and decides the proper level of 
scrutiny to apply.68 
At step one, courts have derived the scope of the Second Amendment right 
from non-self-defense sources. For example, over half of Second Amendment 
opinions rely on language in Heller about categories of laws that are 
“presumptively lawful.”69 That list includes: 
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons[, or] . . . prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools 
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.70 
 
 63. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 15 (data for self-defense references on file with author). 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero-Leco, 446 Fed. App’x 610 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Heller’s holding that “the Second Amendment confers an individual right to bear arms for self-
protection” before remanding for application of the two-part approach described in text accompanying 
notes 65–68, infra). 
 65. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 
F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A two-step inquiry has emerged as the prevailing approach . . . .”); see 
also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that the two-
part methodology had been largely adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016). 
 66. The Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Marzzarella, credited as the first to describe 
the two-part framework, cited the First Amendment ruling in United States v. Stevens as its inspiration. 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 
218, 233 (3d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)). A similar framework applies in equal protection 
cases. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (first determining 
classification, then choosing corresponding level of scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) 
(same). 
 67. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. 
 68. Id. 
 69. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008); Ruben & Blocher, supra note 
15, at 1488–89 (60 percent of lower court decisions cite Heller’s list of presumptively lawful historical 
regulations). 
 70. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (citations omitted). 
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Heller’s list appears to have nothing to do with any understanding of self-
defense. Ex-felons and the mentally ill maintain their self-defense rights, but, 
according to the list, lose their Second Amendment rights.71 People do not leave 
their self-defense rights at the door of “sensitive” places, but do abandon their 
Second Amendment rights.72 Lower court reliance on Heller’s list of Second 
Amendment limitations might be explained by precedential, pragmatic, or 
historical rationales,73 but it cannot be understood by reference to the operation 
of lawful self-defense. And importantly, Heller’s exceptions are not exhaustive 
and do not point to principled limitations beyond the specific categories of 
enumerated laws.74 
Historical weapons laws also provide guidance at step one.75 This is 
unsurprising—Heller said that “longstanding” regulations, including those on its 
list of exceptions,76 are “presumptively lawful.”77 More generally, the opinion 
has been called “the finest example” of “‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence 
ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”78 But basing Second Amendment decisions 
solely on historical weapons laws presents immense challenges. For one thing, 
it strains the competency of judges, who are not trained as historians and often 
do not have access to or time to review the entire historical record.79 Even more 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. To be sure, the historical rationales may fall short of the originalist metrics purportedly 
guiding the Heller majority. See Siegel, supra note 26, at 198 (noting “questions about the temporal 
locus of authority” for these exceptions). 
 74. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures 
only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“[A] regulation that is ‘longstanding,’ which necessarily means it has long been accepted by the public, 
is not likely to burden a constitutional right; concomitantly the activities covered by a longstanding 
regulation are presumptively not protected from regulation by the Second Amendment.”); United States 
v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[L]ongstanding limitations are exceptions to the right 
to bear arms.”); see also Blocher, supra note 10, at 413 (“Heller categorically excludes certain types of 
‘people’ and ‘Arms’ from Second Amendment coverage, denying them any constitutional protection 
whatsoever.”). 
 76. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 77. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 & n.26. 
 78. Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What it Says, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 
2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121452412614009067 [https://perma.cc/ZX37-3S9H]. But see 
Miller, Text, History, and Tradition, supra note 10, at 858 (2013) (noting that the Heller majority 
“refuse[d] to explain how [its] history-centered test may operate in litigation”). In light of Heller’s 
emphasis on originalist theory, then-judge Brett Kavanaugh called for text, history, and tradition to 
govern all Second Amendment decision-making. See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that “Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans 
and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate 
scrutiny”). In practice, courts cite historical sources to decide less than 20 percent of Second Amendment 
challenges. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 15, at 1492. 
 79. See Peruta v. City of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1155 n.6 (9th Cir. 2014), (noting the court 
“will inevitably miss some [historical precedents]” because “[t]he briefs filed in this appeal were able to 
address only so many before running up against word limits”), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 919 
(9th Cir. 2016); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 
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troublingly, history often provides ambiguous insight.80 For example, historical 
precedent exists to support a homebound Second Amendment right,81 an 
unfettered public carry right,82 and various shades in between.83 The Second 
Circuit opined in one public carry case that “[h]istory and tradition do not speak 
with one voice here.”84 Perhaps as a result, historical inquiry is not prominent in 
the vast majority of Second Amendment opinions.85 Finally, we cannot assume 
that basing Second Amendment boundaries solely on the presence or absence of 
historical weapons policies, like basing them on Heller’s list of exceptions, will 
comport with the Second Amendment’s self-defense purpose. 
Another source of guidance at step one bears mentioning: First Amendment 
free speech analogies.86 The Supreme Court referenced First Amendment 
doctrine in Heller,87 and likely because of what Timothy Zick calls the First 
Amendment’s “expansionist tendencies,”88 it is a favored analogue for gun rights 
proponents. But “[t]he modern free speech right is a function of a unique history 
 
F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We[] face institutional challenges in conducting a definitive review of 
the relevant historical record.”); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY 
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 50 (2012) 
(characterizing originalist judges as “play[ing] amateur historian”). 
 80. See WILKINSON, supra note 79, at 51 (“[T]rue history is often tentative and qualified, and 
the danger exists that judicial certitude will do a disservice to both the judicial and historical crafts.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Miller, Guns as Smut, supra note 13; Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm 
Regionalism: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J. F. 121, 134 (2015) 
(discussing public carry prohibitions in frontier towns in the era of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 82. See, e.g., Bliss v. Kentucky, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 92 (1822) (striking down a concealed carry 
ban, explaining that the right to bear arms “existed at the adoption of the [Kentucky] constitution; it had 
then no limits short of the moral power of the citizens to exercise it, and it in fact consisted in nothing 
else but in the liberty of the citizens to bear arms”). 
 83. The oft-cited Statute of Northampton imposed circumstantial limitations on public carry. 
See 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 258 (mandating that individuals 
“bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in [f]airs, [m]arkets, 
nor in the presence of the [j]ustices or other [m]inisters, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit 
their [a]rmour to the King, and their [b]odies to prison at the King’s pleasure”). William Blackstone 
cited this law in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, noting that “riding or going armed, with 
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the 
land.” 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at *148–49. 
 84. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012); see also WILKINSON, 
supra note 79, at 42 (“[T]he main defect of originalism is that historical research is often inconclusive.”). 
 85. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 15, at 1492 (noting that 16 percent of lower court decisions 
include separate historical analysis). 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (looking to the First 
Amendment for guidance on the two-step framework). 
 87. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“Of course the right was 
not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not, . . . Thus, we do not read the 
Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we 
do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”) (citing United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008)). 
 88. See Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Right, 46 HASTINGS CONST. 
L. Q. 621, 673 (2019); see also Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318 
(2018). 
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and some distinctive attributes” not shared by the Second Amendment.89 Most 
significantly, First Amendment doctrine is geared toward protecting values other 
than self-defense,90 making it at best an imperfect guide for assessing the 
coverage of the Second Amendment. 
In practice, courts applying the first step of the two-step inquiry have 
reached imprecise conclusions about whether and how challenged regulations 
impinge conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment. Courts are 
frequently uncertain about the scope of the right to keep and bear arms because 
many cases defy easy historical answers, are not resolved by Heller’s list of 
exclusions, or bear little resemblance to First Amendment disputes. Judges 
considering public carry cases have generalized that the Second Amendment 
“must have some application in the . . . context of the public possession of 
firearms,”91 but the precise coverage is unknown. Likewise, those deciding 
challenges to assault weapon bans have said they “cannot be certain 
whether . . . prohibitions of certain semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding 
more than ten rounds meaningfully affect the right to keep and bear arms.”92 
Unsurprisingly, then, cases are often decided at step two: the application of 
tiered scrutiny. The Fourth Circuit summed up the trend: 
[W]e are not obliged to impart a definitive ruling at the first step of 
the . . . inquiry. And indeed, we and other courts of appeals have 
sometimes deemed it prudent to instead resolve post-Heller challenges 
to firearm prohibitions at the second step.93 
The second step requires determining how much protection to give 
regulated conduct, people, or arms. That protection has typically corresponded 
to standards of review familiar to free speech jurisprudence.94 Heller expressly 
rejected rational basis review,95 so courts generally apply heightened scrutiny, 
either intermediate or strict. The standard of review in free speech cases varies 
depending on the burden on free speech, and courts have said the same applies 
in Second Amendment cases: the greater the burden on the right, the stricter the 
scrutiny.96 
 
 89. Zick, supra note 88, at 674 (highlighting “the textual and conceptual capaciousness of 
‘speech’ and the ubiquity of communicative activity,” and how “free speech rights have long been a 
cornerstone of American democracy”). 
 90. See Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, 80 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 169–71 (2017) (discussing distinctive First and Second Amendment 
purposes). 
 91. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (italics in original). 
 92. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 93. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 94. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 95. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008). 
 96. See, e.g., Marzarrella, 614 F.3d at 96–97. 
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So far, lawful self-defense, the stated core of the right, has factored only on 
the margins in this tiered scrutiny framework, if at all.97 Some judges rely on 
Heller’s emphasis on the acute need for self-protection within the home to apply 
stricter scrutiny to restrictions affecting home possession than to restrictions 
affecting public possession.98 This binary approach can be criticized as over-
reading Heller,99 however, and some courts have rejected it altogether.100 A more 
stable basis for the home/public distinction would be self-defense law, which has 
traditionally extended a broader right to use lethal defensive force in the home 
than in public.101 Post-Heller doctrine has not adopted that grounding, however. 
Other lower courts have considered a lesser standard of review when a 
banned weapon is not truly necessary for self-defense in light of alternatives.102 
In Kolbe v. Hogan, for example, the Fourth Circuit noted that Maryland’s ban on 
assault weapons and large-capacity magazines “leav[es] citizens free to protect 
themselves with a plethora of other firearms and ammunition. Those include 
magazines holding ten or fewer rounds, nonautomatic and some semiautomatic 
long guns, and—most importantly—handguns. The handgun, of course, is ‘the 
quintessential self-defense weapon.’”103 
And yet Heller itself seems to stand in the way of this usage of self-defense. 
The Supreme Court declared that “[i]t is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that 
it is permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of 
other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.”104 Judges have invoked that 
 
 97. The continued viability of such a framework is an open question. At oral argument in Heller, 
Chief Justice John Roberts called tiered scrutiny “baggage that the First Amendment picked up” and 
questioned why the court would adopt tiered scrutiny in the Second Amendment context when “we are 
starting afresh.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290). Ultimately, the 
Heller majority opted for a categorical approach, but did not close the door on tiered scrutiny, as reflected 
by its widespread adoption by lower courts. 
 98. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (stating that the Second Amendment “elevates above all 
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”); 
Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 964 (9th Cir. 2014) (considering a safe storage 
law a violation of the “core” of the Second Amendment right because it involved a restriction in the 
home). 
 99. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (alluding to the need for “future evaluation” of issues not before 
the court). 
 100. See, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding 
that the Second Amendment right in the home and in public are coequal). 
 101. Under the “castle doctrine,” individuals in their home can lawfully use lethal force even if 
they could safely retreat and avoid a confrontation. On the other hand, individuals in public situations 
historically had a duty to retreat if they could safely do so. Many jurisdictions have moved away from 
duty-to-retreat in favor of stand-your-ground, but the Model Penal Code espouses the traditional rule. 
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) and (2)(b)(ii)(A) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official 
Draft 1962); infra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing castle doctrine). 
 102. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 138 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 
(2017). 
 103. Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 629). 
 104. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
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statement to oppose an alternatives analysis,105 but the issue has not received 
careful consideration in relation to Heller’s holding about the Second 
Amendment’s self-defense core. Indeed, an alternatives analysis that considers 
the availability of sufficient, less lethal weapons—not just equally lethal 
alternatives—might find support in analogies to the self-defense requirement of 
necessity.106 
Most post-Heller Second Amendment opinions thus fail to closely consider 
self-defense, leaving a doctrinal void. The next Section describes how some 
judges have sought to fill it in a way that effectively immunizes guns from 
regulation. 
2. Self-Defense as a Shield to Firearm Regulation 
Far from ignoring self-defense’s relevance, some courts have invoked it as 
a boundless construct that implies a relatively unfettered right to have and carry 
handguns. If one assumes that the Second Amendment provides maximal 
protection to handgun possession, a possible conclusion is that the Second 
Amendment must protect a right to carry a handgun virtually everywhere. After 
all, as Justice Clarence Thomas observed in a recent dissent, “[s]elf-defense has 
to take place wherever a person happens to be.”107 
Three federal courts of appeals have applied parallel logic to strike down 
restrictions on carrying handguns in public. Rejecting the home/public binary, 
the Seventh Circuit relied on the notion that “self-defense . . . is as important 
outside the home as inside” to strike down Illinois’s total prohibition on carrying 
handguns in public.108 
The District of Columbia and Hawaii imposed a lesser restriction on public 
carry by establishing a permitting system that required an applicant to show good 
cause, or a heightened risk of being attacked, before they could obtain a permit 
to carry handguns in public.109 In Wrenn v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit 
 
 105. See, e.g., Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 161–62 (Traxler, J., dissenting) (arguing that an alternatives 
analysis was “expressly rejected” by Heller) (emphasis omitted). 
 106. See infra notes 286, 296–298, and accompanying text (further discussing this possibility). I 
am not the first scholar to consider the viability of a Second Amendment alternatives analysis—others 
have suggested that such a test could be supported by First Amendment analogies. See Joseph Blocher 
& Darrell A. H. Miller, Lethality, Public Carry, and Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 
282, 284, 291 (2016). Paul H. Robinson has also opined that the increasing effectiveness of less-than-
lethal weapons could render firearms unnecessary for many self-defense situations. See Paul H. 
Robinson, Shoot to Stun, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/opinion/02robinson.html [https://perma.cc/L6YB-ZVB9]. 
 107. Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1998–99 (2017) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self–Defense: An 
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1515 (2009)). 
 108. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 109. See Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, No. 12-
17808, 2019 WL 494053 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2019); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655–56 
(D.C. Cir. 2017). This regulatory regime is fairly common. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4 (West 
2019) (requiring applicant to demonstrate a “justifiable need to carry a handgun”); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
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struck down the District’s good-cause policy, noting that the Second 
Amendment’s “‘core lawful purpose’ is self-defense, and the need for that might 
arise beyond as well as within the home.”110 This supported the conclusion that 
“possession and carrying—keeping and bearing—are on equal footing.”111 Just 
as Heller found a right to possess handguns regardless of need, the D.C. Circuit 
concluded that citizens have a right to carry them in public regardless of need.112 
By the D.C. Circuit’s logic, requiring an advance showing of need, as mandated 
by the D.C. law, “completely prohibits most residents from exercising the 
constitutional right to bear arms.”113 
After Wrenn, a Ninth Circuit panel reached a similar conclusion in Young 
v. Hawaii, which involved Hawaii’s good-cause law.114 The court emphasized 
“the centrality of self-defense” in Heller,115 and, like the D.C. Circuit, concluded 
that handgun carry rights presumably pertain wherever self-defense might 
occur.116 Hawaii law limited public carry permits to those who could show 
“reason to fear injury to the applicant’s person or property,”117 a standard rarely 
if ever met in the eyes of the government agents implementing the scheme. The 
Court struck down the policy as violating the Second Amendment.118 
The decisions in Wrenn and Young have resulted in a circuit split, as other 
courts have upheld good-cause policies under intermediate scrutiny. Yet no 
courts or commentators have scrutinized the way the D.C. Circuit and Ninth 
Circuit invoked self-defense to maximize gun rights. In an earlier Fourth Circuit 
case, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III warned that “[t]he notion that ‘self-defense 
has to take place wherever [a] person happens to be’ . . . portend[s] all sorts of 
litigation over schools, airports, parks, public thoroughfares, and various 
additional government facilities.”119 Another critique, unexplored in case law 
and scholarship, is that the boundless portrayal of self-defense espoused in 
Wrenn and Young overlooks limitations on lawful self-defense. The next section 
considers those limitations and how they might inform Second Amendment 
doctrine. 
 
§ 400.00 (McKinney 2017) (requiring applicant to demonstrate “proper cause,” interpreted to mean a 
“special need for self-protection,” Klenosky v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1980)). 
 110. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008)). 
 111. Id. at 666. 
 112. Id. (finding a Second Amendment right to “carry a gun in the face of ordinary self-defense 
needs”). 
 113. Id. at 665 (emphasis in original). 
 114. See Young, 896 F.3d 1044. 
 115. Id. at 1051. 
 116. Id. at 1068 (“Once identified as an individual right focused on self-defense, the right to bear 
arms must guarantee some right to self-defense in public.”). 
 117. Id. at 1048. 
 118. See id. at 1074. 
 119. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) 
(quoting Volokh, supra note 107, at 1515). 
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II. 
BRINGING SELF-DEFENSE LAW INTO FOCUS 
As the discussion of case law in the last Part demonstrates, courts are 
unclear about the proper role of self-defense in deciding Second Amendment 
cases. However, they have overlooked a straightforward approach seemingly 
suggested by Heller: borrowing from the law of self-defense to inform Second 
Amendment doctrine. 
The notion of taking from one doctrinal area, like self-defense, to 
implement another, like the Second Amendment, is not new. Nelson Tebbe and 
Robert Tsai have shown that “[w]herever constitutional interpretation happens, 
borrowing is likely to be found,”120 in part “to take advantage of accumulated 
wisdom” from better-developed areas of law.121 Indeed, this is already happening 
in Second Amendment law and scholarship.122 Given that the Supreme Court 
oriented the Second Amendment around lawful self-defense and arguably 
invoked the self-defense requirements of necessity and imminence in Heller,123 
the law of self-defense would seem an obvious source of guidance. However, it 
has yet to play a prominent role in the analysis. 
One possible explanation for the omission is a tendency to look within the 
Constitution for analogues. Tebbe and Tsai focused their review on migrating 
law from one constitutional area to another.124 Courts and scholars likewise have 
focused on migrating other constitutional doctrine to the Second Amendment, 
ranging from First Amendment to Seventh Amendment rules and standards.125 
Yet each constitutional right “bears its own bespoke doctrinal formula,”126 
which sometimes involves drawing on sources of law beyond the four corners of 
the Constitution. For example, Fourth Amendment cases have drawn on common 
and positive law to derive constitutional standards.127 William Baude and James 
 
 120. Nelson Tebbe & Robert Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 464 (2010) 
[hereinafter Tebbe & Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing]. But see Jennifer E. Lauren, Trawling for Herring: 
Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (2011) (critiquing 
borrowing from constitutional tort doctrine to define the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule); Nelson Tebbe & Robert Tsai, Notes on Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. SIDEBAR 140 (2011) (responding to Professor Lauren). 
 121. Tebbe & Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, supra note 120 at 467. 
 122. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text (discussing efforts to import doctrine from 
the First Amendment into the Second). 
 123. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 124. Tebbe & Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, supra note 120, at 464 (indicating that they are 
focusing on “appropriations” “that span discrete fields of domestic constitutional law”). 
 125. See supra notes 10, 86–90. 
 126. Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REV. 144, 166–67 (2016). 
 127. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (“In reading the [Fourth] 
Amendment, we are guided by the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 
afforded by the common law at the time of the framing, since [a]n examination of the common-law 
understanding of an officer’s authority to arrest sheds light on the obviously relevant, if not entirely 
dispositive, consideration of what the Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be reasonable.”) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) 
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A. Stern recently argued that positive law should be even more integrated in 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.128 Likewise, in the Fifth Amendment takings 
context, constitutional law draws on both common and positive law to determine 
protected property interests.129 Drawing on the law of self-defense to develop 
principled Second Amendment doctrine would not be aberrational. 
This Part describes two basic requirements of lawful self-defense—
necessity and proportionality—before discussing their potential application to 
Second Amendment doctrine. 
A. Necessity and Proportionality in Self-Defense Law 
By grounding the Second Amendment in lawful self-defense, the Supreme 
Court also grounded it in a carefully circumscribed body of law. The government 
criminalizes acts of physical aggression in order to achieve its basic goal of 
minimizing private violence.130 Lawful self-defense is an exception to this 
general sanction. Self-defense is only lawful when necessary and proportional. 
Those requirements have the effect of shepherding conflicts away from violence, 
and especially lethal violence.131 As one scholar put it: 
Force can be used only when necessary. Deadly force can be used only 
to prevent death or great bodily harm and, in many jurisdictions, only if 
there is no possibility of retreat. So, in principle, the law requires that 
the attacked party submit to a non-deadly beating rather than defend 
with deadly force. The law prefers retreat and loss of honor to the 
unnecessary taking of life. And it generally construes the requirements 
of retreat and necessity very strictly.132 
 
(same); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (same); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 
931 (1995) (same); William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth 
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1833–34 (2016). But see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth 
Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1739–41 (2000) (challenging the historical 
provenance of using Framing-era common law to delineate the Fourth Amendment’s boundaries). 
 128. Baude & Stern, supra note 127, at 1833–34. 
 129. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (“Because the 
Constitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is 
determined by reference to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such 
as state law.’”) (internal citation omitted); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) 
(limiting Fifth Amendment compensation obligation in regulatory takings contexts by reference to “the 
State’s law of property and nuisance”); Baude and Stern, supra note 127, at 1842 (“[T]he property rights 
protected by the Fifth Amendment are defined by extrinsic sources of positive law, typically state law, 
rather than by the Constitution itself.”). 
 130. See Joshua Dressler, Justification and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the 
Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1163 (1987) (noting that “the taking of human life” is “the most 
serious crime against a person that can be committed”). 
 131. See Robinson, supra note 23, at 252–53, 256. 
 132. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 105, 
115 (1990). 
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Traditional self-defense law, it has been said, “tilt[s] in favor of the 
preservation of human life.”133 Edward Coke referenced the “precious regard the 
Law hath of the life of man.”134 Blackstone did the same, explaining a person’s 
duty to retreat by reference to “a real tenderness of shedding his brother’s 
blood.”135 Traditionally, these values dovetailed with the notion that the state 
monopolized lawful force. Indeed, historically, homicide was justified only 
under limited circumstances, such as the prevention of a small number of 
specified felonies, in which a person “acted as an actual or implicit agent of the 
sovereign.”136 Killing purely in private self-defense, and not to prevent one of 
those specified felonies, was only excusable, requiring a sovereign pardon after 
trial and conviction.137 Over time, the law has come to treat self-defense as a 
justification for violence; but invoking the right to self-defense still requires 
exposure to the same criminal justice system that punishes unjustified 
violence.138 Lawful self-defense still requires a showing of necessity and 
proportionality. 139 
 
 133. Miller, Self Defense, supra note 6, at 89. Of course, as with other legal areas, commentators 
do not agree on a single self-defense philosophy. George Fletcher noted that the law governing defensive 
force is a “composite” and “hybrid” model that reflects “deeper ideological clashes.” FLETCHER, supra 
note 22, at 874. The same is surely true of the Second Amendment. See Blocher & Miller, What is Gun 
Control?, supra note 11, at 348 (noting that no “single account of the Second Amendment will command 
unanimous support, any more than agreement has emerged regarding a theory of free speech or equal 
protection”). 
 134. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 56 (1st ed. 
1644). 
 135. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at *185; see also id. at *186 (“the law sets 
so high a value upon the life of a man, that it always intends some misbehaviour in the person who takes 
it away, unless by the command or express permission of the law.”). 
 136. Miller, Self Defense, supra note 6, at 88–89. 
 137. Id. at 87–95; see also Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-
1600, 74 MICH. L. REV. 413, 436 (1976) (“[T]hose who acted in defense of property fared better under 
the evolving law than those who acted solely in defense of their person.”). 
 138. Aggressive stand-your-ground laws are chipping away at this procedural characteristic of 
self-defense. In Florida, for example, defendants can invoke self-defense as an immunity to prosecution, 
avoiding trial altogether. See FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012–.013 (2019). Such procedural departures from 
traditional self-defense law are an area in need of further scholarly exploration. 
 139. Paul Robinson’s treatise on criminal law defenses provides the following definition of self-
defense: 
Conduct constituting an offense is justified if: 
1) an aggressor unjustifiably threatens harm to the actor; and 
2) the actor engages in conduct harmful to the aggressor 
a) when and to the extent necessary for self-protection, 
b) that is reasonable in relation to the harm threatened. 
2 PAUL ROBINSON CRIM. L. DEF. § 132 (2018). The first requirement, an unjustifiable threat to the actor, 
is what Robinson terms a “triggering condition” for self-defense. It reflects the fact that lawful self-
defense cannot arise in the absence of a threat, and even then, only arises when the threat is unjustified. 
One generally cannot invoke self-defense against a police officer executing an arrest, for example, nor 
after first unlawfully attacking someone. See id. § 131(b)(2). The unjustifiable-threat requirement may 
have purchase for the Second Amendment, as might the requirement of a “reasonable belief” in the 
necessity of defensive force, supra note 18. However, the focus of my analysis is on the second and third 
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1. Necessity 
By the 1500s, consensus had already formed that a person killing in self-
defense could go free only if the person reasonably believed the killing was 
necessary.140 From then on, common law treatises regularly underscored the role 
of necessity. In the eighteenth century, Matthew Hale wrote that it must be 
“necessity, which obligeth a man to his own defense and safeguard.”141 William 
Hawkins agreed that “[i]t must be owing to some unavoidable Necessity, to 
which the Person who kills another must be reduced without any manner of Fault 
in himself.”142 Blackstone likewise limited excusable homicide in self-defense 
to “sudden and violent cases; when certain and immediate suffering would be 
the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law.”143 
The first reported self-defense opinion in the United States, State v. Wells, 
was issued the year before the Second Amendment’s adoption.144 After the 
defendant struck a fatal blow with a club during a fight,145 he told witnesses that 
he never believed himself to be in serious danger.146 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court used the defendant’s statements to reject his claim of self-defense: “[N]o 
man is justified or excusable in taking away the life of another unless the 
necessity for doing so is apparent as the only means of avoiding his own 
destruction or some very great injury, neither of which appears to have been 
reasonably apprehended in the present case.”147 
In 1806, this understanding was repeated in the jury charge in 
Commonwealth v. Selfridge, which was characterized as a “leading American 
authority on the Law of Self-Defense.”148 Fearing an attack, Thomas Selfridge 
purchased a pistol.149 He later encountered an enemy, armed with a walking 
stick, on a Boston street. A confrontation ensued, Selfridge was struck over the 
head with the walking stick, and he fired the pistol, killing his adversary.150 At 
his trial for manslaughter, Selfridge claimed self-defense.151 
 
requirements ((2)(a) and (2)(b)), which correspond to the longstanding requirements of necessity and 
proportionality. 
 140. See Bernard J. Brown, The Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of Provocation 
as a Defence to Murder in English Law, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 310–11 (1963). 
 141. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 478 (1736). 
 142. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 69 (1716). 
 143. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at *184. 
 144. State v. Wells, 1 N.J.L. 424 (N.J. 1790). 
 145. Id. at 426, 430. 
 146. Id. at 430. 
 147. Id. (emphasis added). 
 148. Commonwealth v. Selfridge, 2 Am. St. Trials 544, 549 (Mass. 1806). 
 149. Id. at 548. Evidence suggested that Selfridge “had been informed an attack upon him was 
intended.” Id. at 693. 
 150. Id. at 548. The precise sequence of events was disputed, but at minimum the fight arose 
suddenly. Id. 
 151. Id. at 693 (noting that the killing by the defendant was “confessed as well as proved,” leaving 
the “great question in the case[:] whether according to the facts shown to you on the part of the 
prosecution, or by the defendant, any reasonable, legal justification or excuse has been proved”). 
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Judge Isaac Parker’s jury charge emphasized necessity as the core 
limitation on lethal defensive force.152 In a statement representative of many 
others, Parker explained that self-defense only exculpates the defender if he “use 
all the means in his power, otherwise, to save his own life or prevent the intended 
harm, such as retreating as far as he can, or disabling his adversary without 
killing him if it be in his power.”153 
Today, necessity remains “the pervasive theme of the well defined 
conditions which the law imposes on the right to kill or maim in self-defense.”154 
The D.C. Circuit noted in United States v. Peterson that “‘[t]he law of self-
defense is a law of necessity’; the right of self-defense arises only when the 
necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity; and never must the 
necessity be greater than when the force employed defensively is deadly.”155 As 
Paul Robinson puts it, defensive force is only lawful “when and to the extent 
necessary for self-protection.”156 
The requirements of imminence and retreat are two doctrinal proxies for 
ensuring that killing in self-defense is truly necessary. The permissible use of 
force in self-defense is generally limited to situations in which an individual has 
a reasonable anticipation of “imminent” harm.157 If not, “there may be avenues 
 
 152. See, e.g., id. at 697 (“If you believe under all the circumstances, the defendant could have 
escaped his adversary’s vengeance, at the time of the attack, without killing him, the defense set up has 
failed, and the defendant must be convicted. . . . If you believe his only resort for safety was to take the 
life of his antagonist, he must be acquitted.”); id. (“[U]nless the defendant has satisfactorily proved to 
you that no means of saving his life, or his person from the great bodily harm which was apparently 
intended by the deceased against him, except killing his adversary, were in his power—he has been 
guilty of manslaughter.”); id. at 700 (“But if . . . he did not purposely throw himself in the way of the 
attack, but was merely pursuing his lawful vocations, and that in fact he could not have saved himself 
otherwise, than by the death of the assailant—then the killing was excusable, provided the circumstances 
of the attack would justify a reasonable apprehension of the harm which he would thus have a right to 
prevent.”). 
 153. Id. at 690. 
 154. United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 155. Id. at 1229 (citation omitted). Peterson is used in leading casebooks to demonstrate self-
defense principles. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND 
MATERIALS 516–22 (2019); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 870–71 
(2017). 
 156. 2 ROBINSON, supra note 139, at § 132. 
 157. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4, 205 at n.51 (October 2017 
Update) (collecting citations); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-606 
(2019); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19 (2019); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21 (2019); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, 
§ 5/7-1 (2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2 (2019); IOWA CODE ANN. § 704.3 (2019); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-5222 (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.050 (2019); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20 (2019) 
(homicide only); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (2019) 
(homicide only); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.031 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-102 (2019); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 627:4 (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-7 (2019) (homicide only); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 35.15 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.209 (2019); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-35 (homicide only) (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611 (2019) (homicide 
only); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.050 (2019) (homicide only); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.48 (2019) (deadly force). 
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open to the defendant to prevent [threatened violence] other than to kill or injure 
the prospective attacker.”158 Given the close relationship between imminence 
and necessity, it is arguably redundant for self-defense law to require showings 
of both.159 Yet the dominant view, both historically and now, is to make separate 
inquiries into necessity and the temporal proximity of a threat.160 
Requiring retreat before the exercise of deadly force is also a manifestation 
of the necessity requirement, albeit one limited to certain lethal confrontations.161 
William Blackstone wrote: 
[T]he law requires that the person, who kills another in his own defence 
[during a sudden affray], should have retreated as far as he conveniently 
or safely can, to avoid the violence of the assault, before he turns upon 
his assailant; and that, not fictiously, or in order to watch his 
opportunity, but from a real tenderness of shedding his brother’s 
blood.162 
Judge Parker adopted this view in Selfridge, stating that before using lethal force 
in self-defense, a man must “use all the means in his power, otherwise, to save 
his own life or prevent the intended harm, such as retreating as far as he can.”163 
A traditional exception to the retreat requirement is when lethal self-
defense occurs in the home. As Blackstone explained, “the law of England has 
so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles 
it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity.”164 The so-
called “castle” doctrine is accepted by all American jurisdictions.165 This 
traditional distinction between the scope of permissible self-defense in the home 
and outside the home, as noted above,166 could be helpful in drawing principled 
distinctions in Second Amendment law. 
 
 158. See LAFAVE, supra note 157, at § 10.4(d), 206. 
 159. See, e.g., KADISH ET AL., supra note 155, at 914 (“[If imminence is a proxy for necessity,] 
why should imminence and necessity be independent requirements?”). 
 160. Id. Different authorities have offered different articulations of the imminence requirement. 
In Blackstone’s description, the timing of the unjustified threat had to be quite close to the defensive 
response, “when certain and immediate suffering would be the consequence of waiting for the assistance 
of the law.” 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at *184. Blackstone’s might be closest to 
the “imminence” formulation that predominates in many jurisdictions. But the standard has been relaxed 
elsewhere. The Model Penal Code, for example, permits the use of defensive force when “immediately 
necessary” in response to unlawful force by another “on the present occasion.” MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 3.04(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404 
(2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464 (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 28-1409 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4 (2019); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 505 (2019); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-11-611 (2019); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (2019). 
 161. RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT (1991). 
 162. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at *184–85. 
 163. Commonwealth v. Selfridge, 2 Am. St. Trials 544, 691 (Ma. 1806). 
 164. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at *223. 
 165. See KADISH ET AL., supra note 155, at 924 (noting that “[a]ll American jurisdictions” accept 
the castle doctrine). 
 166. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing this possible application of castle 
doctrine). 
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In recent years, the duty to retreat before resorting to lethal defensive force 
in situations outside the home has been a subject of great debate. However, this 
debate is not new.167 Though it would not firmly take root in the United States 
until the 1800s, some English commentators had already questioned the 
requirement of retreating in public places.168 The ascension of a no-retreat rule 
in some parts of the United States in the 1800s was in no small part due to the 
strong notion of personal autonomy that likewise ascended during that time 
period, coupled with a sense that requiring an innocent person to retreat because 
of another’s wrongful threat was codifying cowardice.169 
But it would be incorrect to conclude that no-duty-to-retreat has been 
universally accepted by penal law drafters and experts. At the turn of the 
nineteenth century, Joseph Beale wrote an influential article advocating duty-to-
retreat as the optimal rule.170 When the Model Penal Code was drafted in 1962, 
its authors agreed.171 In 1978, George Fletcher predicted that the legal tide would 
turn in that direction.172 The tide did not turn, however, in large part because of 
an effort led by the National Rifle Association to codify no-duty-to-retreat across 
much of the country.173 Today, “[i]n decisions based on common-law principles, 
there has been a distinct tendency to favor a requirement of retreat in settings 
outside the home.”174 But the majority of the states—at least twenty-eight of 
them—have passed laws eschewing that requirement.175 
The controversy over stand-your-ground laws highlights a complexity 
inherent in using self-defense law to set Second Amendment boundaries: self-
defense law is not static through time or between jurisdictions. Resolving which 
legal understanding of self-defense should serve as a baseline is a significant 
second-order question, but its significance should not be overstated for two 
reasons. First, change has happened primarily on the margins; the basic 
requirements of necessity and proportionality are universally accepted, even in 
 
 167. See generally Joseph H. Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567 
(1903) (summarizing historical debate). 
 168. See, e.g., MICHAEL FOSTER, REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION OF 
OYER AND TERMINER (1762); see also Beale, supra note 167 at 573–76 (discussing Foster’s writing on 
retreat). 
 169. See, e.g., Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (Ohio 1876) (“[A] true man, who is 
without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to 
take his life or do him enormous bodily harm.”). Interestingly, while jurists in many American 
jurisdictions were persuaded to scrap the duty to retreat by English commentators like Michael Foster, 
England retained the traditional duty to retreat. See BROWN, supra note 161, at 7. 
 170. See Beale, supra note 167 at 573–76. 
 171. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 172. FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 867–68 (“Though the case law remains conflicted, the future 
might well be reflected in the Model Penal Code’s recommending the duty to retreat as the norm.”). 
 173. See LAFAVE, supra note 157, § 10.4(f) (discussing National Rifle Association’s push for 
stand-your-ground laws). 
 174. KADISH ET AL., supra note 155, at 921–22. 
 175. See “Stand Your Ground” Laws, GIFFORDS L. CTR., http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-
laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/stand-your-ground-laws [https://perma.cc/8D62-A9QR]. 
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stand-your-ground jurisdictions, and have been essentially immune to change.176 
Second, to the extent there are material differences between self-defense laws, 
the resulting baseline issue is not intractable. Rather, it resembles other areas of 
constitutional law that look to background law for doctrinal guidance.177 I do not 
take a position in this Article about how to resolve this baseline question—for 
example, whether courts should assume a static self-defense baseline set at the 
time of the Second Amendment’s adoption in 1791178 or a baseline that shifts 
through time and even from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.179 For the purposes of 
my analysis, I focus on the mechanics of how the basic, universal doctrinal 
requirements of necessity and proportionality might translate to Second 
Amendment doctrine. 
2. Proportionality 
The requirement of proportionality, which limits permissible defensive 
force to that which is “reasonable in relation to the harm threatened,”180 is less 
prominent in historical discussions than necessity. However, “[t]here can be little 
doubt that proportionality is a clearly recognized requirement in Anglo-
American Law.”181 The Model Penal Code Commentaries emphasize that it is a 
“common law principle that the amount of force used by the actor must bear a 
reasonable relation to the magnitude of the harm that he seeks to avert.”182 
Proportionality in self-defense law reflects the legal system’s “recognition 
of the value of human life”183 and a general belief that excessive force is 
unnecessary and unreasonable. So, for example, in the 1705 case Cockroft v. 
 
 176. See, e.g., Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199 (Ohio 1876) (adopting stand-your-ground, 
but then noting that the “taking of life in defense of one’s person cannot be either justified or excused, 
except on the ground of necessity,” which must be “imminent at the time . . . and no man can avail 
himself of such necessity if he brings it upon himself”). 
 177. See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text (discussing uses of positive and common 
law in Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine). 
 178. After all, Heller espoused the view that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope 
they were understood to have when the people adopted them.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 634–35 (2008). 
 179. See generally Joseph Blocher, Disuniformity of Federal Constitutional Rights, U. ILL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming) (highlighting ways that federal constitutional rights are not uniform throughout the 
country). 
 180. 2 ROBINSON, supra note 139, at § 132; see LAFAVE, supra note 157, at § 10.4(b) (“[T]he 
amount of force [one] may justifiably use must be reasonably related to the threatened harm which [one] 
seeks to avoid.”). 
 181. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 
218 n.72 (1982). 
 182. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES 47 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985); cf. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at *181–82 (noting that “[t]he law of 
England . . . is too careful of the lives of the subjects . . . nor will suffer with impunity any crime to 
be prevented by death, unless the same, if committed, would also be punished by death”). 
 183. See Robinson, supra note 181, at 218 (explaining why “an actor [with] no other option but 
deadly force to prevent the stealing of apples . . . [must] sacrifice her apples out of regard for the life of 
the thieves”); see also supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text (quoting Blackstone and Coke). 
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Smith, Sir John Holt, the Chief Justice of England, declared that the plea of self-
defense is unavailable during an affray “where the second assault is excessive,” 
such as when Smith “bit a joint off from the plaintiff’s finger” after the plaintiff 
“ran his finger towards Smith’s eyes.”184 As Chief Justice Holt explained, 
“hitting a man a little blow with a little stick on the shoulder, is not a reason for 
him to draw a sword and cut and hew the other.”185 
The proportionality requirement was invoked in both of the Framing-era 
cases discussed in the last subpart: Wells and Selfridge. In Wells, the defendant 
picked up and wielded a club in a fistfight, resulting in a skull fracture and the 
victim’s death.186 The defendant’s self-defense claim failed in part because he 
used lethal force despite a nonlethal threat. As the court put it, “[T]he attack of 
the deceased was without any kind of weapon that might have rendered it 
necessary for the prisoner to avail himself of the instrument which occasioned 
the death.”187 
This statement is especially interesting when viewing the intersection of 
self-defense and the right to keep and bear arms. The court expressly linked its 
determination of unnecessary, disproportionate force to the specific arm chosen 
by the defendant. 
In addition to charging the jury on the requirement of necessity, Judge 
Parker in Selfridge also instructed that if the circumstances of the attack “denote 
an intention to take away [Selfridge’s] life, or do him some enormous bodily 
harm; [he] may lawfully kill the assailant.”188 Judge Parker then elaborated, 
linking the lawfulness of lethal force to the weapon used by an aggressor: “I 
doubt whether self-defense could in any case be set up, where the killing 
happened in consequence of an assault only, unless the assault be made with a 
weapon which if used at all, would probably produce death.”189 
Today, U.S. jurisdictions universally accept some form of the 
proportionality requirement. Penal codes generally differentiate between 
“deadly” and “moderate” force, and delineate when deadly force is justified in 
self-defense.190 “All authorities agree” that deadly defensive force is permissible 
when a person is threatened with unjustified “death or serious bodily injury.”191 
Only nondeadly force can be used to defend oneself against less serious 
threats.192 
 
 184. Cockcroft v. Smith, [1705] 11 Mod. 43, 88 Eng. Rep. 872 (K.B.) (Holt, C.J.) (emphasis in 
original). 
 185.  Id. 
 186. State v. Wells, 1 N.J.L. 424, 426 (N.J. 1790). 
 187. Id. at 430. 
 188. Commonwealth v. Selfridge, 2 Am. St. Trials 544, 691 (Mass. 1806). 
 189. Id. at 696. 
 190. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.04, 47 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985). 
 191.  Id. 
 192. Disagreements persist about whether other types of harms justify the use of deadly force. 
For example, some jurisdictions limit lawful lethal defensive force to threats of death or serious bodily 
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B. Using Self-Defense Law to Construct Second Amendment Doctrine 
The regulation of violence is a basic concern of government; so too is the 
regulation of the instruments of violence. Despite the “persistent myth” to the 
contrary, weapons regulation has always been a part of American legal history.193 
Justifiable self-defense operates as an exception to general proscriptions on 
violent conduct,194 adjudged by reference to notions of necessity and 
proportionality. This Part considers whether Second Amendment doctrine can 
operate similarly, mandating an affirmative defense to weapons restrictions that 
is governed by necessity and proportionality. 
Infusing such self-defense requirements into Second Amendment doctrine 
can help evaluate regulations on when a person can carry a weapon on their 
person for use in self-defense. Specifically, in this view, the Second Amendment 
protects a right to an affirmative defense when carrying a weapon is reasonably 
necessary and proportionate to a particularized threat. Second Amendment 
doctrine need not, in contrast, protect a right to carry in the absence of such a 
threat. This approach finds support in both Heller and nineteenth-century 
precedent. 
This Part considers two broad categories of restrictions: first, those on 
possessing and carrying operable guns in anticipation of confrontation, and 
second, those on acquiring guns for that purpose. The first category reflects a 
situation in which self-defense law and processes can be imported into Second 
Amendment doctrine with relatively minor adjustments. The second category 
highlights a situation in which the fit is weaker but Second Amendment law 
could still benefit from themes animating lawful self-defense. 
 
injury, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2) (2019) (“The use of deadly force is not justifiable under 
this section unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against 
death or serious bodily harm.”). Model Penal Code jurisdictions add “kidnapping or sexual intercourse 
compelled by force or threat,” Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b) (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Official Draft 
1962) (emphasis added), and others include additional specified crimes, see, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE. 
ANN. § 9.32(a)(2)(B) (2019) (“A person is justified in using deadly force against another . . . when and 
to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary . . . to prevent the 
other’s imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual 
assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery.”). This Article does not consider whether the Second 
Amendment protects weapon possession to defend against these other harms. See supra note 2 
(discussing this Article’s focus on self-defense). 
 193. See BLOCHER & MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 11, at 19–21 
(describing historical gun laws); ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR 
ARMS IN AMERICA 115 (2009) (“Gun safety regulation was commonplace in the American colonies 
from their earliest days.”). As political scientist Robert Spitzer puts it: 
“[W]hile gun possession is as old as America, so too are gun laws. . . . Gun laws were not 
only ubiquitous, numbering in the thousands; they spanned every conceivable category of 
regulation, from gun acquisition, sale, possession, transport, and use, including deprivation 
of use through outright confiscation, to hunting and recreational regulations, to registration 
and express gun bans.” 
ROBERT SPITZER, GUNS ACROSS AMERICA: RECONCILING GUN RULES AND RIGHTS 5 (2015). 
 194. See H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 13 (1968) (“Killing in self-defen[s]e is an exception to a general rule making killing punishable.”). 
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1. Possessing and Carrying Arms for Use in Confrontations 
The Supreme Court made clear in Heller that the Second Amendment 
protects accessing a loaded handgun in the home in one important circumstance: 
when necessary for immediate self-defense. A requirement that lawfully owned 
firearms always be kept inoperable in the home “makes it impossible for citizens 
to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense,” and, hence, such a 
requirement is unconstitutional.195 
This Section shows how that reasoning leaves open the possibility of 
deriving limitations to the Second Amendment right from limitations on lawful 
self-defense. As a doctrinal matter, those limitations could inform the 
constitutional analysis of two categories of regulations, each addressing 
circumstances closely related to the use of arms in self-defense: in-home storage 
laws and public carry restrictions. 
a. Firearm Storage Laws 
The D.C. law challenged in Heller required home-stored firearms to be 
inoperable “at all times.”196 The parties and Justices construed Heller’s 
complaint as seeking to “render a firearm operable and carry it about his home 
in that condition only when necessary for self-defense.”197 The government 
contended that the law had an unwritten self-defense exception, but the Heller 
majority found such an exception “precluded by the unequivocal text” of the 
statute.198 The law did not permit rendering a firearm operable for “immediate” 
self-defense, and therefore was unconstitutional.199 As Justice Breyer framed this 
holding, “the Constitution requires an exception that would allow someone to 
render a firearm operational when necessary for self-defense.”200 That exception 
would logically apply as an affirmative defense to the charge of violating the 
storage requirement, just as self-defense operates post hoc to justify otherwise 
criminal violence. Thus, in this view, a firearm storage law could be made to 
harmonize with the Second Amendment so long as such a defense is available 
and is judged constitutionally sufficient. 
This conception of the Second Amendment would greatly clarify the 
outcome in some Second Amendment disputes. In Jackson v. City and County 
of San Francisco,201 for example, the Ninth Circuit considered a local ordinance 
requiring handguns in the home to be locked or disabled with a trigger lock 
unless carried on the person.202 The law obviously allowed accessing a loaded 
 
 195. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
 198. Id. at 630. 
 199. Id. at 635. 
 200. Id. at 692 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 201. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 202. Id. at 958. 
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firearm when “necessary” for “immediate” self-defense: so long as a gun was on 
the person, it could be loaded and unlocked. Nowhere, however, did the court 
consider the constitutional salience of that fact. Instead, the court upheld the law 
under intermediate scrutiny,203 drawing a vigorous rebuttal by Justice Thomas, 
who dissented from the Supreme Court’s denial of cert and contended that the 
Ninth Circuit’s application of intermediate scrutiny neglected the petitioner’s 
Second Amendment interest in self-defense.204 Because the ordinance went well 
beyond providing a self-defense exception to the storage requirement, however, 
the law in Jackson arguably did not impinge the right to keep and bear arms at 
all, and heightened scrutiny was superfluous. 
Analogizing to the law and operation of self-defense could help resolve 
cases like Jackson, but it also would introduce uncertainty about how to define 
“necessity.” Self-defense necessity and Second Amendment necessity logically 
cannot be coextensive. The Second Amendment contemplates anticipatory 
arming, something not covered by ordinary self-defense principles.205 If an 
elderly man, alone in his home, sees an unfamiliar person on his porch at night, 
it would not be reasonably necessary to shoot at the stranger, but is it reasonably 
necessary to preemptively arm? When self-defense requirements are adapted for 
Second Amendment doctrine, they must be calibrated to the distinct 
circumstance of arming in advance of a confrontation. 
To be sure, “perhaps [self-defense’s] most important aspect” is that “it is a 
preemptive action.”206 The lawful use of defensive force, in other words, takes 
place in advance of an anticipated attack. Distinguishing between necessity in 
anticipatory arming and necessity in anticipatory force is a question of degree, 
not kind.207 
Moreover, necessity accommodates some flexibility even within the self-
defense context. Commentators have disagreed on the proper definition of 
“imminence” and some have argued that imminence should be construed 
differently depending on the circumstances.208 One example is the case of a 
battered person who kills an abuser when an assault is not imminent, such as 
when the abuser is sleeping. The prevailing approach in these cases is not to alter 
 
 203. Id. at 966. 
 204. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2800–01 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 205. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW 
ON TRIAL 73 (1988). 
 206. Larry Alexander, The Need to Attend to Probabilities—For Purposes of Self-Defense and 
Other Preemptive Actions, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 223, 223 (2018). 
 207. Cf. Vera Bergelson, Self-Defense and Risks, in THE ETHICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 131–32 
(2016) (“Self-defense is preemptive by nature, so uncertainty arises on many levels, for example 
determining what defensive force is necessary to fend off a particular right violation.”). 
 208. See supra note 160 (describing variations). 
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the imminence requirement,209 but some scholars argue for a looser approach,210 
and some jurists have agreed.211 Others have argued for a less strict approach in 
other circumstances. For example, Eugene Volokh has proposed a relaxed 
version of imminence for “medical self-defense,” which he describes as 
protecting one’s “life using medical procedures that don’t involve killing, such 
as compensated organ transplants or the use of experimental drugs.”212 In such 
situations, Volokh suggests, “imminence” should only require “a present 
medical threat.”213 A Second Amendment-based defense would similarly require 
loosening the imminence standard. Ultimately, the question of whether the 
standard is met would be answered by a judge or jury at trial. 
A related complexity is that a person may arm in anticipation of the need 
to brandish a gun, not just to fire it. Considering brandishing opens the door to 
complicated baseline questions. How does self-defense treat brandishing relative 
to shooting, and to the extent there are differences, which one should control for 
the Second Amendment analysis? Though there is an intuitive difference 
between the risks presented by brandishing and by shooting, self-defense law 
does not always distinguish between the two. For example, both brandishing and 
shooting present a threat of death or grave bodily injury that can justify lethal 
defensive force in response.214 Meanwhile, in some jurisdictions, brandishing is 
considered a disproportionate response to non-grave threats.215 In those places, 
the law treats both brandishing and firing a gun as deadly force for self-defense 
purposes.216 
 
 209. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 15 (N.C. 1989) (critiquing proposed loosening of 
imminence standard in battered person cases and noting that the “imminence requirement ensures” that 
human lives are taken only “upon the reasonable belief it is necessary to prevent death or great bodily 
harm”); Commonwealth v. Sands, 553 S.E.2d 733, 737 (Va. 2001) (applying traditional imminence 
standards to uphold a murder conviction in a battered wife context). 
 210. See KADISH ET AL., supra note 155, at 914 (discussing debate). This position, in turn, has 
spawned creative arguments that imminence serves a purpose other than necessity, so should not be 
discarded so easily. See, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defendant Imminence: From Battered Women 
to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 255–56, 260–62 (2004) (contending that imminence “stak[es] out the 
type of threats that constitute aggression,” which is the “critical question” in self-defense cases). 
 211. See, e.g., State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 506 (Wash. 1993) (“A threat, or its equivalent, can 
support self-defense when there is a reasonable belief that the threat will be carried out.”). 
 212. See Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and 
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1818, 1824 (2007). 
 213. Id. at 1824. 
 214. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04(2)(b), 3.06(3)(d)(ii), 3.07(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed 
Official Draft 1962). 
 215. See, e.g., Hairston v. State, 54 Miss. 689, 691 (Miss. 1887) (pointing a gun is deadly force); 
People v. Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d 24, 29, (N.Y. 1986) (“The risk of serious injury or death and the capacity 
presently to inflict the same are central to the definition [of ‘deadly physical force’], not the consequence 
of defendant’s conduct or what he intended.”); Commonwealth. v. Jones, 332 A.2d 464, 466 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1974) (“Wielding a knife certainly amounts to the use of deadly force.”). 
 216. The Model Penal Code takes a different approach, excluding brandishing from the definition 
of deadly force “so long as the actor’s purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that he will use 
deadly force if necessary.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
In the Commentaries, the drafters acknowledged a “diversity of opinion” on this issue. MODEL PENAL 
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b. Public Carry Restrictions 
In addition to restrictions on rendering a firearm operable in the home, the 
constitutionality of restrictions on carrying a loaded gun in public might also be 
adjudged through self-defense-style rules. Among the most contentious areas of 
Second Amendment litigation are challenges to such restrictions. Courts have 
struck down absolute bans on public carry in the few places they remained after 
Heller.217 However, federal appellate courts are split on the constitutionality of 
good-cause regimes that require a showing of need in order to obtain a permit to 
carry a handgun in public.218 Some judges have contended that good-cause 
regimes are unconstitutional because the Second Amendment presumptively 
protects perennial arming for lethal defensive force.219 
Borrowing from the law of self-defense would require rejecting that 
limitless proposition. Instead, it would endorse a generally applicable restriction 
on public carry only if combined with a constitutionally required exception for 
narrow, need-based circumstances. Self-defense is limited by notions of 
necessity. So, too, can be the Second Amendment. Self-defense is implemented 
as a defense to criminal sanction. So, too, can be the Second Amendment. 
When it comes to public carry restrictions, this framework has historical 
roots. In 1836, Peter Oxenbridge Thacher220 instructed a grand jury that in 
Massachusetts “no person may go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or 
other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to apprehend 
an assault or violence to his person, family, or property.”221 Judge Thacher likely 
was interpreting a recently passed Massachusetts restriction providing that if 
someone carrying a weapon disturbed the public peace or caused someone 
reasonable fear, the armed person could be forced to post a surety.222 The law, 
 
CODE AND COMMENTARIES 160 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985); cf. id. (noting that 
“[w]hen the Model Code was drafted, the balance of judicial authority favored the view that a person is 
not justified in threatening to shoot [to defend property] if he would not be justified in actually 
shooting”). The Model Penal Code’s approach—which reflects “a restriction of the criminal law”—is 
justified by reference to “other means” of controlling “the display and use of firearms,” namely 
restricting or banning their possession and carriage. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES 161 
(citing English Firearms Act, 1937, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 12). After Heller, a ban would be 
unconstitutional. 
 217. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (Illinois); Palmer v. District of 
Columbia, 59 F.Supp.3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014) (District of Columbia); People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321 
(Ill. 2013) (Illinois). 
 218. See supra notes 109–119 and accompanying text (highlighting circuit split). 
 219. Id. (discussing Wrenn and Young). 
 220. Thacher was a respected jurist whose decisions and writings “had made him known 
throughout the country.” See 3 THE AMERICAN REVIEW: A WHIG JOURNAL OF POLITICS, LITERATURE, 
ART AND SCIENCE 222, 223 (1846). 
 221. PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, TWO CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF 
SUFFOLK, FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE OPENING OF THE TERMS OF THE 
MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, A. D. 1836, AND ON 
MONDAY, MARCH 13TH, A. D. 1837, 27 (1837) (emphasis added). 
 222. 1836 Mass. Acts 750 (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or 
other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or 
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however, provided a self-defense-styled exception for persons with a 
“reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or 
to his family or property.”223 At least seven states adopted similar surety laws 
with self-defense exceptions.224 
An 1871 Texas regulation bore an even closer resemblance to self-defense 
law. To counter Texas’s high rates of violence after the Civil War, the Texas 
government passed a measure prohibiting the carrying of pistols, titled an “Act 
to regulate the keeping and bearing of deadly weapons.”225 The law provided an 
affirmative defense, however, to a defendant who could show “reasonable 
grounds for fearing an unlawful attack on his person,” provided that “such 
ground of attack shall be immediate and pressing.”226 Another section of the law 
provided that making out the defense required showing “that such danger was 
immediate and pressing, and was of such a nature as to alarm a person of ordinary 
courage.” 227 
The 1871 Texas law was widely enforced after its enactment,228 leading to 
various challenges under both federal and Texas constitutional rights to keep and 
bear arms. In State v. Duke, the Texas Supreme Court emphatically upheld the 
law.229 It found that while the Second Amendment did not apply to state and 
local governments230—the widely held understanding at the time231—the Texas 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms did apply. That provision read “Every 
person shall have the right to keep and bear arms, in the lawful defence of himself 
or the State, under such regulations as the Legislature may prescribe.”232 The 
Texas Supreme Court upheld the Act, declaring: 
[The law] undertakes to regulate the place where, and the circumstances 
under which, a pistol may be carried; and in doing so, it appears to have 
respected the right to carry a pistol openly when needed for self-defense 
or in the public service, and the right to have one at the home or place 
 
violence to his person, or to his family or property, he may, on complaint of any person having 
reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be required to find sureties for keeping the 
peace. . . .”). 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Ruben & Cornell, supra note 81, at 132–33 n.61 (collecting similar statutes in 
Wisconsin, Maine, Michigan, Virginia, Minnesota, Oregon, and Pennsylvania). 
 225. Law of April 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 1, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 25, reprinted in 6 H. Gammel, 
Laws of Texas 927 (1898); see also Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Law and Politics of Firearms 
Regulation in Reconstruction Texas, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 95, 97–101 (2016) (recounting history of 
Act). 
 226. Law of April 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 1. 
 227. Id. at § 2. 
 228. Frassetto, supra note 225, at 107 (“The new prohibition on public carry was widely enforced 
across the State, especially by the state police.”). 
 229. State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 459 (Tex. 1874). 
 230. Id. at 457 (citing Borran v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)). 
 231. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 153–56 
(1998). 
 232. TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. I, § 13. 
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of business.233 
One could argue that variations between the text of the Texas constitution 
and the Second Amendment make the former an inapt analogue for the latter. 
Differences include express declarations in the Texas constitution that the right 
protects keeping and bearing arms for self-defense and that the right is not 
absolute, but rather is subject to regulation.234 Yet both of those characteristics 
were engrafted on the Second Amendment in Heller.235 
State v. Duke was the only historical ruling on the salience of a self-defense 
exception cited by the Heller majority.236 However, another favorably cited case, 
State v. Reid,237 also reflects an eighteenth-century court suggesting that the 
boundaries of the right to keep and bear arms may be informed by notions of 
self-defense necessity.238 The defendant in Reid, a local sheriff,239 was convicted 
of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Alabama’s concealed carry ban 
and challenged his conviction under Alabama’s right to keep and bear arms.240 
 
 233. Duke, 42 Tex. at 459 (emphasis added). 
 234. See TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. I, § 13. 
 235. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (“[T]he inherent right of 
self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right.”); id. at 595 (“Of course the right was not 
unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not. Thus, we do not read the Second 
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not 
read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original). 
 236. Id. at 581. Indeed, as 1800s regulations go, the Texas law was unique in the way it expressly 
related public carry to self-defense need. At least one other state followed Texas’s example: In 1882, 
West Virginia passed a law banning the public carriage of “any revolver or other pistol, dirk, bowie 
knife, razor, slung shot, billy, metalic or other false knuckles, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon 
of like kind or character.” 1882 W. Va. Acts ch. 135, § 7. Violating the provision was a misdemeanor. 
Id. The law set up an affirmative defense if a defendant tried for violating the provision “shall prove to 
the satisfaction of the jury that . . . he had good cause to believe and did believe that he was in danger of 
death or great bodily harm at the hands of another person, and that he was, in good faith, carrying such 
weapon for self defense and for no other purpose.” Id. In State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9 (W. Va. 1891), 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia upheld a conviction under the law where a man received 
a threat of violence and then began carrying a pistol without ever reporting his concerns to the public 
authorities. Id. at 12. As the authoring judge explained, “where nothing further appears in evidence for 
the defense than a mere threat of violence which has been communicated to the prisoner, I doubt whether 
it ought in any case to be considered sufficient to compel an acquittal under the statute, especially where 
sufficient length of time has elapsed to have enabled the prisoner to seek the protection of the law.” Id. 
The Court also addressed the constitutionality of the law under the Second Amendment, but did so 
applying a collective-right view, finding pistols not covered by the Amendment, id. at 11, and therefore 
rendering the opinion less helpful than Duke for illuminating the post-Heller constitutionality of such a 
provision. Most public carry regulations in the 1800s, meanwhile, took a more categorical approach 
such as banning concealed carry altogether and permitting open carry under almost all circumstances. 
See Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition 
and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 623–37, 641–56 (2012) 
(providing an overview of restrictions and case law on public carry). As a result, most courts did not 
have the opportunity to rule on the type of regulation involved in Duke. Id. 
 237. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (citing State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–17 (Ala. 1840)). 
 238. But see O’Shea, supra note 236, at 626–27 (describing ambiguity in the breadth of the right 
to bear arms and the corresponding scope of regulatory authority under Reid). 
 239. Reid, 1 Ala. at 621. 
 240. Id. at 614–15. 
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The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the conviction, noting that the law 
permitted the open carrying of arms.241 In doing so, the court emphasized that 
“[t]he right guarantied to the citizen, is not to bear arms upon all occasions and 
in all places, but merely ‘in defence of himself and the State.’”242 It went on to 
interpret the right to bear arms in light of that aim, noting that “if in any case, it 
should appear to be indispensable to the right of defence that arms should be 
carried concealed about the person, the act ‘to suppress the evil practice of 
carrying weapons secretly,’ should [not] be so construed, as to operate a 
prohibition in such case.”243 In Reid, however, “no such necessity seems to have 
existed.”244 Indeed, because the defendant was a sheriff, he “needed no arms for 
his protection, his official authority furnished him an ample shield.”245 
If the Second Amendment demands a necessity-derived exception to public 
carry offenses, then licensing the carrying of handguns on the express basis of 
necessity—as good-cause regimes do—is not per se unconstitutional, contrary 
to the outcomes in Wrenn and Young.246 Both cases implied that requiring a 
showing of necessity before a person can exercise the right to carry a weapon is 
facially unconstitutional.247 As those courts would have it, a person has a right 
to carry a handgun no matter their need for self-defense. But to the extent modern 
good-cause statutes already bake necessity into the statutory scheme, that should 
insulate them, not undermine them, in the constitutional analysis.248 
Of course, today’s good-cause laws, unlike both self-defense and the 1800s 
public carry restrictions, are licensing schemes. The 1830s Massachusetts and 
1870s Texas laws did not license public carry, but rather set up a post-hoc 
decision rule for judges or juries to consider following a violation of the public 
carry restrictions.249 In that regard, they paralleled the implementation of the 
right to self-defense. As a policy matter, administering weapons laws ex ante 
through a licensing scheme, rather than ex post at trial, has various advantages 
for the weapon bearer. Chief among them is the security of knowing that a 
decision to carry will not be second-guessed later by a judge or jury. However, 
 
 241. Id. at 621. 
 242. Id. at 616. Heller made a similar point, that the Second Amendment does not “protect the 
right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 
 243. Reid, 1 Ala. at 621–22. 
 244. Id. at 622. 
 245. Id. at 621. 
 246. See supra notes 109–118 and accompanying text (discussing Wrenn and Young). 
 247. Id. 
 248. My argument here is directed at the facial validity of good-cause laws, not whether they are 
implemented fairly in a given jurisdiction. In other words, I take issue with the conclusion that it is per 
se unconstitutional to require a showing of heightened need before a person can lawfully carry a 
handgun. I do not address in this Article the constitutional problems that arise if a facially valid good-
cause regime were implemented so strictly as to resemble a de facto ban, which is an allegation made in 
some public carry litigation. See, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1071 n.21 (“Hawaii counties 
appear to have issued only four concealed carry licenses in the past eighteen years.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 249. Law of April 12, 1871, ch. 34, §§ 1–2, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 25. 
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licensing has a major drawback when viewed through the lens of self-defense 
law, regardless of whether the permitting scheme requires a showing of good 
cause250: it is impracticable during times of true emergency. 
A tight migration of self-defense law to the Second Amendment context 
would call for a right to carry a handgun without a license in those emergency 
scenarios, similar to the public carry exception in the 1871 Texas law. Besides 
that example, a more recent analogue is the application of the criminal law 
justification of necessity. 
State v. Crawford shows how necessity doctrine can apply in the public 
carry context.251 Before 1972, Maryland had a Texas-style law that allowed 
concealed carry of handguns only as “a reasonable precaution against 
apprehended danger,” to be adjudged after a violation of the otherwise applicable 
ban.252 In 1972, the General Assembly revised the public carry scheme to require 
a permit for public carry of handguns (whether open or concealed), the issuance 
of which generally depended on a showing of good cause.253 The issue in 
Crawford was whether a person could still carry a handgun without a license 
during “the unexpected and sudden circumstance when an individual is 
threatened with present, impending danger to his life or limb and as a 
consequence has no time to seek other protection.”254 The court answered in the 
affirmative, holding that the justification of necessity applied to the situation.255 
If the Second Amendment requires a post hoc rule that incorporates the 
notion of necessity, the outcome in Crawford would be constitutionally required 
by the Second Amendment. Some jurisdictions do not allow the defense of 
necessity in the circumstances that arose in Crawford.256 In those places, the 
Second Amendment would require such a defense.257 
 
 250. For a description of different licensing regimes and data about their relative prevalence, see 
Ali Rowhani-Rahbar et al., Loaded Handgun Carrying Among US Adults, 2015, 107 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1930 (2017). 
 251. State v. Crawford, 521 A.2d 1193 (Md. 1987). 
 252. Id. at 693 & n.2. The law differed from the Texas statute in that it allowed open carry of 
handguns so long as the carrier did not have “the intent or purpose of injuring any person in any unlawful 
manner.” Id. 
 253. Id. at 693–95. That scheme, which exists to this day, has been upheld in the face of a Second 
Amendment challenge. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 254. Crawford, 521 A.2d at 1199. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See LAFAVE, supra note 157, § 10.1(a), 157 (noting “defense of necessity is available only 
in situations wherein the legislature has not itself, in its criminal statute, made a determination of 
values”). 
 257. For another possible analogue, consider the jury instruction at murder trials in various 
jurisdictions that a “person who has been threatened with death or serious bodily harm and has 
reasonable grounds to believe that such threats will be carried into execution, has the right to arm himself 
in order to combat such an emergency.” Bevley v. Commonwealth, 36 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Va. 1946); see 
also State v. Summers, 188 S.E. 873, 875 (W. Va. 1936) (holding that an appropriate instruction was 
that “one who has been threatened with murderous assaults and who has reason to believe that such 
assaults will be made, may arm himself for defense and in such case no inference of malice can be drawn 
from the fact of preparation for it”); Oklahoma Jury Instruction, DE WITT C. BLASHFIELD, 2 
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The approach just outlined will, of course, invite objections. One is that if 
necessity was not required for possession of an unloaded handgun in the home 
in Heller,258 it likewise should be immaterial for the carrying of an unloaded 
handgun in public. This argument only has force to the extent that home 
possession and public carry are afforded identical protection. However, many 
courts have assumed that the Second Amendment right is weaker in public than 
in the home because of language in Heller.259 The traditional law of self-defense 
supports that view through the castle doctrine, which recognizes a broader zone 
of autonomy within the home than in public.260 Moreover, there are strong 
pragmatic grounds to protect home possession of an unloaded gun that need not 
extend to public possession. As discussed below in the context of firearm 
acquisition,261 any constitutionally protected gun use presumes the acquisition of 
an unloaded gun and ammunition, both of which would logically be stored in the 
home. 
Another likely objection is that implementing the Second Amendment with 
self-defense-delineated doctrine would mean that people have no constitutional 
right to carry a loaded, operable gun in case they encounter random acts of 
violence, when they would be lawfully allowed to use the gun for self-defense. 
According to this view, regardless of the fact that most people who carry guns 
never face such situations, the Second Amendment must protect the ability to be 
constantly armed with a gun in case one arises. This objection boils down to the 
position adopted by Wrenn and Young: the Second Amendment presumptively 
 
BLASHFIELD’S INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES § 3892, at 2704 (defendant 
“might lawfully arm himself for the purpose of self-defense in anticipation of . . . threats being carried 
into execution,” provided that the executed threats “would endanger his life or subject him to great 
bodily harm” and the defendant “feared or had reason to fear that such threats were liable to be carried 
into execution”). The instruction is refused, however, when a person preemptively arms without 
perceiving any specific threat. See, e.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 487 S.E.2d 857, 862 (Va. Ct. App. 
1997). These charges seem to have been given mostly in jurisdictions applying an inference of malice 
in murder trials when a deadly weapon is used. Such inferences have fallen out of favor, see Bruce A. 
Antkowiak, The Art of Malice, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 436 (2008) (discussing trend away from deadly 
weapon inferences), but these charges are still relevant in demonstrating the use of necessity as a 
doctrinal limitation on anticipatory arming. 
 258. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text (discussing Heller’s handgun holding). 
 259. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The state’s 
ability to regulate firearms and, for that matter, conduct, is qualitatively different in public than in the 
home. Heller reinforces this view.”); supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing cases espousing 
this view). 
 260. See Miller, Guns as Smut, supra note 13 at 1304–10 (using castle doctrine to support a 
homebound right). This distinction should not be overstated. The castle doctrine only obviates the duty 
to retreat; it does not affect the overarching rule of necessity, which is in effect within and without the 
home alike. Miller notes that the inside-outside distinction has constitutional salience across different 
areas of constitutional doctrine. Id. (describing how the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth 
Amendment, and others reflect that “[t]he home occupies a special place in the pantheon of 
constitutional rights”) (quoting United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 261. See infra notes 262–275 and accompanying text. 
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protects a right to keep and bear handguns wherever lawful self-defense might 
occur.262 
The proposed framework would not constitutionally protect perpetual gun-
carrying, and thus would not protect gun-carrying in advance of such 
unanticipated attacks. As noted, this outcome is consistent with Heller’s ruling 
on the D.C. firearm storage law and some historical precedent.263 Moreover, the 
alternative would be wildly overinclusive, protecting gun carrying during times 
when the need for self-defense with a gun is remote or nonexistent,264 which in 
turn could present a threat to public safety.265 Courts could reasonably reject such 
an expansive, overly protective doctrinal approach.266 
Indeed, another consideration weighing in favor of self-defense-styled rules 
is that the alternative—constitutionally protecting constant gun carrying—places 
at risk the law of self-defense itself. If the Second Amendment protects a broad 
right to carry handguns virtually everywhere and at all times, and most 
Americans choose to exercise that right, conflicts would regularly present a 
threat of lethal violence, and lethal force would regularly be perceived as a 
reasonably proportional and necessary response.267 In such a world, necessity 
and proportionality mean less, no longer moderating between lethal and 
 
 262. See supra notes 109–118 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra notes 196–245 and accompanying text. 
 264. Cf. PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO 
KNOW 21 (2014) (“[T]here is one defensive gun use per year against an intruder for every 3,500 homes 
that keep guns.”). 
 265. The presence of a firearm during a conflict intensifies the conflict. See Philip J. Cook & 
Harold A. Pollack, Reducing Access to Guns by Violent Offenders, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. 
SCI. 2, 4 (2017) (noting increased risk of death when a firearm, as opposed to another weapon, is present 
during confrontation). Various studies also indicate that states with more restrictive licensing schemes 
for the public carrying of firearms experience significantly lower rates of gun-related homicides and 
other violent crimes. See, e.g., Cassandra K. Crifasi et al., Association Between Firearm Laws and 
Homicide in Urban Counties, 95 J. URBAN HEALTH 383 (2018); John J. Donohue III et al., Right-to-
Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Penal Data and a State-Level 
Synthetic Control Analysis, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 198 (2019); John J. Donahue et al., Right-
to-Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and a State-Level 
Synthetic Controls Analysis, 16 J. EMP. L. STUDIES 198, 199 (1999); Michael Siegel et al., Easiness of 
Legal Access to Concealed Firearm Permits and Homicide Rates in the United States, 107 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1923, 1923–29 (2017). 
 266. Cf. FALLON, supra note 9, at 6–7 (discussing how courts make “practical, instrumental, and 
tactical judgments about the appropriate role of the judicial branch” when developing constitutional rules 
and standards). 
 267. This downstream consequence on the law of self-defense of an unduly broad understanding 
of the Second Amendment is not farfetched. The rise and fall of the doctrine of chance medley, a 
precursor to provocation, has been attributed to the presence of weapons. See Bernard J. Brown, The 
Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of Provocation as a Defence to Murder in English Law, 
7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 312 (1963). In the sixteenth century, the “custom of wearing side-arms” meant 
that sudden affrays often turned deadly. Such killings lacked the premeditation characteristic of murder, 
but had more culpability than would warrant exculpation. Id. at 310–13. Chance medley filled the void, 
providing a middle ground. Id. It fell into disuse, however, when “the custom of wearing sidearms 
became disestablished.” Id. 
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nonlethal defensive force.268 Elected officials in some jurisdictions may choose 
to dilute longstanding self-defense limitations in this way by embracing 
unrestricted gun carrying,269 but it is difficult to see how the Second Amendment 
requires that outcome, especially if the legal tradition of self-defense is at its 
core. 
Heller made clear that the Second Amendment does not “protect the right 
of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.”270 Adapting self-defense 
law for Second Amendment doctrine is a principled way to approximate the 
confrontations contemplated by the post-Heller Second Amendment. 
2. Acquiring Specific Types of Firearms 
The previous section suggests that Second Amendment doctrine can 
usefully draw on the law of self-defense with respect to carrying a weapon for 
an imminent confrontation, but what about protected Second Amendment 
conduct further in advance of a confrontation, such as the acquisition of an arm? 
Before taking up an operable handgun for self-defense in the home or in public, 
one must first acquire an unloaded handgun and ammunition to load it. It would 
be untenable to require a person to wait for a cognizable necessity to arise before 
acquiring a gun.271 And, indeed, Heller suggests a distinction between how the 
Second Amendment treats acquiring a handgun that would be locked in the home 
and unlocking and loading the handgun when necessary for immediate self-
defense.272 The distinction is logical. 
The question arises, then, whether self-defense law can offer any doctrinal 
guidance for protected conduct that must far precede the use of defensive force. 
The earlier in time relative to a potential conflict, the harder it is to clearly define 
necessity and proportionality by reference to how those limitations operate for 
the purposes of self-defense. Likewise, a post hoc legal process, such as an 
affirmative defense, ceases to be a workable way of implementing the right. This 
challenge would come up in connection with various regulations, perhaps most 
prominently bans on the acquisition of assault weapons and large capacity 
magazines (“LCMs”). 
 
 268. See supra Part II.A (discussing these requirements). 
 269. See infra notes 167–175 (discussing adoption of stand-your-ground laws); see also Larry 
Copeland & Doug Richards, Ga. Governor Signs “Guns Everywhere” into Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 23, 
2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/23/georgia-gun-law/8046315 
[https://perma.cc/VP37-BTNZ]. 
 270. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
 271. Cf. Michael Steven Green, Paradox of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 52 DUKE L.J. 113, 158 (2002) (making a similar 
point if the right to keep and bear arms is understood as an instrumental right to enable popular revolt). 
 272. See supra notes 51–61 and accompanying text (discussing Heller’s rulings with respect to a 
firearm storage law and handgun ban). 
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Assault weapons and LCMs are frequently the weapons of choice for mass 
shooters, and thus are an obvious regulatory target.273 At the same time, however, 
they have become popular among many gun owners.274 Prohibiting these 
weapons generates high-profile Second Amendment litigation. Most courts have 
upheld such bans, though for very different reasons and over vehement 
dissents.275 The Second Circuit, for example, upheld bans in New York and 
Connecticut under intermediate scrutiny.276 The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, 
relied on Heller’s statement that the Second Amendment does not protect 
“dangerous and unusual” weapons.277 Dissenting judges in that case opined that 
no matter their dangerousness, assault weapons receive Second Amendment 
protection because of their popularity.278 
The rules and requirements of self-defense law do not fit as closely in this 
context as they do in the context of storage laws or public carry restrictions.279 
Among other things, a post hoc decision rule is impracticable. Moreover, self-
defense law is generally indifferent as between different ways to apply lethal 
force. The self-defense requirements of necessity and proportionality speak to 
the circumstances under which lethal force can be applied, not which lethal 
weapon can be used. If force is so excessive that it recklessly causes collateral 
injury or death, it can give rise to liability for battery or involuntary 
manslaughter,280 but that liability does not turn on the self-defense requirements 
of necessity and proportionality, the focus of this Article.281 
And yet even in this context, one can imagine a role for the concepts of 
necessity and proportionality that would render the constitutional analysis more 
consistent with the core purpose of self-defense. Assault weapons with LCMs, 
 
 273.  See Mark Follman et al., A Guide to Mass Shootings in America, MOTHER JONES (May 31, 
2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map [https://perma.cc/EQ8G-
BCKJ] (showing that over 10 percent of the firearms used in mass shootings (as defined by the study) 
from 1982 to 2012 were assault weapons, and over 25 percent used a high capacity magazine). 
 274. See Jon Schuppe, America’s Rifle: Why so Many People Love the AR-15, NBC NEWS, (Dec. 
27, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/america-s-rifle-why-so-many-people-love-ar-15-
n831171 [https://perma.cc/2Y43-329N] (“In 2004, 107,000 [AR-15s] were made. In 2015, the number 
was 1.2 million, according to the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF). . . .”). 
 275. One such dissent was written by then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh. See Heller v. District of 
Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also is on record 
questioning the lower court consensus. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 276. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 264 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 277. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 135–38 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 
(2017). 
 278. Id. at 151–60 (Traxler, J., dissenting); see also Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 
1031 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“the relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant 
when the weapon belongs to a class of arms commonly used for lawful purposes”). 
 279. The fact that the framework cannot apply across the board is not fatal to that framework. I 
anticipate that the Second Amendment right will spawn a nuanced patchwork of doctrine for different 
contexts, as has happened for other rights. 
 280. See LAFAVE, supra note 157, at § 10.4(g). 
 281. I do not consider in this Article whether the law of battery or involuntary manslaughter might 
also inform the Second Amendment analysis of particularly dangerous weapons. 
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for example, “tend to result in more numerous wounds, more serious wounds, 
and more victims” than other guns,282 calling into question whether their use is 
“proportionate” to any reasonably anticipated harm. Proportionality, in this 
sense, might add clarity to Heller’s exclusion of “dangerous and unusual” 
weapons,283 defining the phrase to include weapons out of proportion to common 
threats.284 
Yet any line drawing based on which firearms are necessary or 
proportionate would surely be contested for all but the most destructive firearms. 
Indeed, a common critique of bans on assault weapons is that those weapons are 
not materially different from other rifles.285 Deciding on relative lethality as 
between different firearms and then determining when a firearm becomes 
disproportionate to likely threats is a difficult endeavor. 
The burden would be lessened to the extent that Second Amendment 
doctrine also adopted an alternatives analysis. Self-defense law takes stock of 
alternatives, especially less lethal ones. As Paul Robinson has colorfully noted, 
“a person with a tenth degree karate black belt who shoots a knife-wielding 
attacker when he could instead safely and easily disarm the attacker with an 
expert kick” cannot assert that the shooting was justified, because it was 
unnecessary.286 If that notion is adapted for the Second Amendment, a court 
might inquire whether an assault weapon is necessary for self-defense in light of 
less lethal alternatives. 
However, Heller refused to consider alternatives to handguns in the context 
of home possession.287 To be sure, the only alternatives raised by the government 
were other lethal weapons—long guns. But the opinion could be read to reject a 
role for any alternatives, including less lethal ones, given the handgun’s 
popularity:288 “It is enough to note, as we have observed, that the American 
people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense 
weapon.”289 
 
 282. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 262 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 283. Courts have struggled to make sense of this carve-out. See, e.g., Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 135–36 
(noting a range of questions about determining what counts as “dangerous and unusual”). 
 284. One could argue that military-style weapons are proportionate to some threats, like terrorist 
attacks. But that train of thought is limitless, whereas Heller made clear that the Second Amendment 
right, like all rights, is limited. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (endorsing 
historical exclusion of “dangerous and unusual” weapons). Proportionality would operate in reference 
to common threats rather than rare hypothetical situations demanding the rapid firing of thirty bullets. 
 285. See, e.g., James B. Jacobs, Why Ban “Assault Weapons”?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 681, 707 
(2015) (“So-called ‘assault weapons’ are not machineguns or automatic-fire weapons, but are 
semiautomatics functionally identical to scores of firearms that are not classified as assault weapons.”). 
 286. See Robinson, supra note 23, at 253. 
 287. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban 
the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.”). 
 288. Id. The functional differences between handguns and long guns were also addressed in 
various amicus briefs in Heller. See Blocher & Miller, What is Gun Control?, supra note 106, at 292 
n.79. 
 289. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
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Heller’s handgun holding, and the notion of weapon popularity on which it 
rests, is problematic for many reasons.290 This Article raises another unexplored 
ground for critique: to the extent it places handguns atop the Second Amendment 
hierarchy of arms, Heller is in tension with the logical implications of placing 
lawful self-defense at the Second Amendment’s core. Scholarship has explored 
the ways that Heller’s historical analysis is incoherent.291 Tensions between 
Heller and self-defense principles present fertile ground for subsequent 
exploration and critique. 
CONCLUSION 
Heller’s essential holding was to place lawful self-defense at the core of the 
Second Amendment. This Article contends that this core is unstable. Despite ten 
years of post-Heller litigation, the role that self-defense plays in Second 
Amendment doctrine remains unresolved. Considering the Second Amendment 
through the lens of self-defense law’s requirements and procedures offers a novel 
perspective that might bring stability. Judges have stated that the Amendment 
protects the carrying of handguns regardless of necessity292 and does not 
calibrate protection as between different weapons on the basis of their 
dangerousness.293 If self-defense law and principles are guides for Second 
Amendment doctrine,294 those conclusions are dubious. 
Beyond doctrinal implications, focusing on our legal tradition of self-
defense suggests broader conclusions for Second Amendment theory. The law 
of self-defense reflects a commitment to shepherding conflicts away from 
violence, especially lethal violence. The Supreme Court’s allusion to necessity 
 
 290. See supra note 56. 
 291. Judge Richard Posner called it “faux originalism,” a historical “snow job[]” and 
“freewheeling discretion strongly flavored with ideology.” Richard Posner, In Defense of Looseness, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness 
[https://perma.cc/6RQD-UARG]. Judge Harvie Wilkinson III called it a “new” form of judicial activism 
based in “originalism.” J. Harvie Wilkinson, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 
VA. L. REV. 253, 274 (2009). Reva Siegel chronicled the “temporal oddities” in Heller—the way the 
Court used authority from various time periods to support its conclusions about the original 
understanding of the text of the Second Amendment. Siegel, supra note 26, 195–201. Saul Cornell has 
relentlessly exposed anachronism in the opinion. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms 
Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1695 (2012). 
 292. See supra notes 107–118 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
 294. The discussion here is by no means exhaustive. Both self-defense and the right to keep and 
bear arms are complex rights with extensive commentary. I do not consider, for example, the intricacies 
of the first component of Paul Robinson’s definition of self-defense, that a threat giving rise to lawful 
defensive force must be unjustified. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 139, at § 132. I also leave to future 
projects self-defense doctrine relating to reasonableness, mistake, defense of others, defense of property, 
or any number of other relevant factors for defensive force. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 157, at 
§ 10.4. 
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when ruling on the D.C. firearm storage law in Heller,295 as ambiguous as it was, 
can be read as heeding this overarching self-defense orientation. By contrast, 
broad claims of virtually unfettered gun rights stray from that commitment. 
This conclusion challenges the modern Second Amendment orthodoxy and 
part of Heller itself, which both assume that one type of highly lethal weapon, 
the handgun, receives maximal constitutional protection.296 Bringing the Second 
Amendment in line with its self-defense core may call for a “fundamental 
reordering” of that understanding.297 “Arms” encompasses more than 
firearms,298 and respecting the self-defense value in preserving all life should 
mean reducing the protection afforded to firearms relative to that afforded to less 
lethal weapons. More generally, if we take Heller at its word that self-defense is 
at the core of the Second Amendment, then the right to keep and bear arms cannot 


















 295. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text (discussing Heller’s holding regarding the 
D.C. firearm storage law). 
 296. See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Tebbe and Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, supra note 120 at 464, 481 (suggesting that 
“good faith” borrowing can lead to such a “fundamental reordering”). 
 298. The Supreme Court went to great lengths to make clear that “arm” does not mean “firearm,” 
but “weapon.” Framing-era dictionaries, the Court explained, defined arms as “[w]eapons of offence, or 
armour of defence.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (quoting Samuel Johnson, 
1 Dictionary of the English Language 106 (4th ed. 1978)); see also id. (defining arm as “any thing that 
a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another”) 
(quoting Timothy Cunningham, 1 A New and Complete Law Dictionary (1771)). “Thus,” the Court 
concluded, “the most natural reading of ‘keep Arms’ in the Second Amendment is to ‘have weapons.’” 
Id. at 582; see also id. at 592 (“Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee 
the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”). Sources relied on by the 
majority invoked “arms” to refer to bows and arrows, id. at 581 (citing Cunningham, supra), and knives, 
id. at 590 (citing P. BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES 359 (1968)). 
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